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CLASS ACTION CHAOS? THE THEORY OF THE CORE
AND AN ANALYSIS OF OPT-OUT RIGHTS
IN MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS
Michael A. Perino *
From breast implants to cigarettes, mass tort class actions are a
prominent and controversial part of the contemporary litigation land-
scape. A critical component of these actions is the ability qf class mem-
bers to "opt out" and thereby exclude themselves from the effect of any
class judgment. The tension between individual autonomy and the desire
for global resolution of mass controversies has led to an intense debate
concerning the circumstances under which opt-out rights should be con-
strained, if at all.
This Article makes five distinct contributions to the class action litera-
ture. First, the Article applies the game theoretic concept of the "core"
to class action litigation. Core theory describes the conditions under
which coalitions tend to be stable and provides a ready analogue to
class litigation. The Article next demonstrates that global class resolu-
tions often require that litigants' bargaining strategies, including opt-out
rights, be constrained in order to create a core. Third, the Article dem-
onstrates that opt-out rights often do not serve their intended purpose
and can act primarily to frustrate the resolution of complex claims.
Fourth, the Article proposes the conjecture that a core theoretic model
while simplified and reductionist, is sufficiently robust to generate essen-
tially all of the problems observed in class litigation. Agency and other
problems that have been at the heart of much class action scholarship
certainly exist, but may not be analytically essential to an explanation of
observed settlement and litigation patterns. Finally, core theory high-
lights an inherent paradox in class actions. In cases where claims for
individual autonomy are strongest, opt-out rights are powerful bargain-
ing tools that can destroy class actions and dramatically shift power
within classes. In classes with traditionally weaker claims for preserving
individual autonomy, opt-out rights may be both unnecessary and unlike-
ly to disrupt class-wide resolutions. The recognition of opt-out rights in
cases where it is feasible for litigants to exercise them can thus destroy
the effectiveness of the class mechanism that serves as the foundation for
those rights in the first instance. Individual autonomy may thus be fun-
* Lecturer, Stanford Law School; Deputy Director, Roberts Program in Law and Business.
The author would like to thank Joseph Grundfest and Randall Thomas for their comments on an earli-
er draft of this Article. All errors are, of course, my own.
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damentally incompatible with obtaining global resolution in mass tort
and other kinds of class actions.
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MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Class action litigation has reshaped the notion of "justice" in American
courts. A wide category of claims once perceived as beyond the reach of the
judiciary now seeks to impose liability running into the hundreds of billions
of dollars for the benefit of tens of millions of potential claimants. These
claims raise a broad set of social, economic, and policy concerns. They span
issues as diverse as the addictive qualities of cigarette smoking, damage
caused by asbestos, the health risks of breast implants and other medical
devices, the spread of AIDS, the use of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War,
and the safety of various automobile designs. The mere pendency of a mass
tort class action has driven otherwise profitable enterprises to declare bank-
ruptcy. Concern over potential litigation may have kept many products out of
United States markets.
The rapid growth of the class action mechanism has been accompanied by
an outpouring of judicial, scholarly, and popular commentary analyzing a
dizzying array of related concerns. Central to much of the debate is the ten-
sion between a litigant's individual autonomy and the necessity to employ
collective procedures in mass litigation.' That tension is often addressed
through the mechanism of the "opt-out" right, which provides individual class
members with a choice between proceeding as members of a class who will
be bound by a class-wide settlement or "opting out" of the class and pursuing
their claims through individual adjudication.2 Many scholars and judges rec-
' See Robert L. Rabin, Continuing Tensions in the Resohtion of Mass Toxic Harm Cases: A Com-
ment, 80 CORNELL L. ItEV. 1037, 1040-42 (1995).
" The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in at least two cases this Term that involve these inherent
tensions in the application of the class action mechanism to mass tort cases. In the first case, Adams v. Rob-
ertson, 676 So. 2d 1265 (Ala. 1995), cert. granted. 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), the Court granted certiorari to
examine whether an Alabama state court's certification of a class action and approval of a settlement vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because class members had not been afforded
the ability to opt out of either the class or the settlement. The Supreme Court never reached the merits in
Adams. On March 3, 1997, it dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the Alabama
Supreme Court had not addressed this issue in its opinion. Adams v. Robertson, No. 95-1873, 1997 U.S.
LEXIS 1490 (Mar. 3, 1997).
The Court also granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's decision to overturn certification of a
"futures only" settlement class action in an asbestos mass tort case, i.e., a settlement that purported to re-
solve claims of parties who had been exposed to asbestos but who had not yet filed suit. See Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc.. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. grantedsub, nora. Amchem Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 117
S. Ct. 379 (1996). In a settlement class, a complaint, a request for class certification, and a proposed set-
tlement are filed contemporaneously. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's
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ognize that the individualized model of litigation makes little sense in mass
tort cases alleging injuries to thousands or even millions of people, but also
believe that opt-out rights serve important instrumental and symbolic roles in
mass litigation?
This Article re-examines this debate through the lens of game theory and
the concept of "core." Core theory describes the conditions under which co-
alitions will or will not tend to be stable and thus provides a ready analogue
to class litigation. A game has a "core" when there is a strategy that all the
coalition members are willing to follow because that strategy is more profit-
able than the returns that could be captured by any sub-coalition that can
credibly threaten to defect. As demonstrated in greater detail below, even a
highly reductionist, three-person bargaining model is able to generate results
which capture many of the real-life complexities of class action litigation.
The model demonstrates that class action litigation often cannot be resolved
until the litigants' bargaining space is sufficiently constrained so as to create
a core when there might not otherwise be one. Viewed from this perspective,
the name of the game in achieving global resolution of mass litigation is
crafting a resolution mechanism that forces a consensus on claimants who
have no natural incentive to cooperate with each other because they are argu-
ing over the division of a fixed pie. The model also demonstrates that many
of the claims made for preserving opt-out rights are flawed because opt-outs
often do not serve their intended purpose.
determination that a court may certify a settlement class only if the case would satisfy the requirements for
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) even if there were no settlement and the case
was to be litigated. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 624-26. Georgine raises broader issues, however, that go to the
heart of the tension between individualized adjudication and collective processing because the settlement
purported to resolve the claims of between 250.000 to two million people, many of whom had not even
manifested any symptoms from asbestos exposure at the time of the settlement. Among the significant ques-
tions this kind of settlement raises are whether any meaningful notice can be provided to such claimants.
whether these claimants had a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the settlement, whether settlement class-
es encourage collusive settlements or attorney opportunism, and whether a court approving a settlement of
such claims is straying from the limited role of the judiciary and usurping the role of a legislature. When
this Article went to press, the Supreme Court had not yet rendered a decision in Georgin:e.
As discussed more fully in the remainder of the Introduction, the primary focus of this Article is not
to address the settlement class mechanism, but rather to provide a theoretical framework for understanding
the bargaining strategies and problems that can arise from the grant or denial of opt-out rights in mass tort
cases. In addressing these issues, the Article discusses both Georgine and some of the issues settlement class
actions raise. See infra notes 81-85. 225-35, and 305-06 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the core theoretic model is sufficiently robust that this Article ten-
tatively asserts a "core completeness conjecture"-that core theory can ex-
plain many if not all of the problems and phenomena observed in class ac-
tions. This conjecture stands in contrast to much of the class action scholar-
ship of the last decade, which has relied heavily on agency problems, market
failure, or other procedural imperfections. While these problems certainly
exist in class litigation, they can be encompassed within the broader core
theoretic model. For this reason, the concept of core can serve as an exceed-
ingly valuable organizing principle for the analysis of class action litigation
and settlement dynamics.
Finally, core theory highlights an inherent paradox in class action litigation.
Claims for preserving individual autonomy in class actions vary in strength
depending on the nature of the underlying claims at issue. Cases in which
claims for individual autonomy are typically strongest, such as many mass
tort cases, are likely to be the most unstable because they are likely to have
the greatest frequency of opt-outs. Opt-out rights in these cases can act as
powerful bargaining tools that can destroy class actions and dramatically shift
power within them. By contrast, in cases with traditionally weaker claims for
preserving individual autonomy, opt-outs are unnecessary because they are
unlikely to perform any instrumental function. At the same time, they are also
unlikely to disrupt class-wide resolutions because few claimants are likely to
invoke them. The upshot of core theoretic analysis is that the recognition of
opt-out rights in cases where they can be feasibly exercised can destroy the
effectiveness of the class mechanism that serves as the foundation for those
rights in the first place. The entire notion of class action litigation with exten-
sive opt-out rights may thus suffer from the fundamental paradox that
litigative autonomy is often incompatible with the resolution of aggregative
claims.
These topics are analyzed in five parts. Part II provides a brief history of
mass tort cases, with a particular emphasis on the treatment of opt-out rights.
Part III describes the scholarly commentary relevant to opt-outs and the game
theoretic concept of core that to date has been missing from that commentary.
Part IV describes a simple core theoretic model of class actions. This Part
demonstrates how bargaining strategies can be constrained to form a core.
The Part also analyzes the effects opt-outs can have on other class members
and on the prospects for successful aggregative resolutions. Part V provides
some real-world analogues that are consistent with core theory and suggests
that core theory is sufficiently robust to encompass all observed class action
1997]
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phenomena. Finally, Part VI discusses the legal implications of a core theo-
retic analysis of class actions.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS
Mass tort class actions have evolved through four phases. 4 In each phase,
courts have wrestled with a desire to employ aggregative techniques in mass
tort litigation while still respecting individual autonomy. Each phase is
marked by a different resolution of that problem. In the first phase, courts
routinely denied class certification motions due to a concern that individual
issues would overwhelm common ones.5 In the second phase, courts experi-
mented with class certification and relied on the opt-out mechanism to justify
this aggregative technique.6 In the third phase, courts recognized that opt-
outs often made efficient global resolution and settlement of class actions
difficult and turned to Rule 23(b)(1) mandatory classes, only to discover that
the appellate courts would rebuff this solution.' Finally, in the fourth phase,
appellate courts have reasserted their strong concerns about whether the class
action device is appropriate in mass tort cases.' Thus, courts are now often
The real world of course tends to resist historical categorization. Although one can in fact discern
four phases of mass tort class action evolution, those phases are by no means temporally distinct. One can
find early evidence of later trends and a significant overlap between evolutionary phases. Nonetheless, this
four-phase evolutionary cycle is, at a minimum, a useful pedagogical construct. Other commentators also
view this history in the same evolutionary terms. See John C. Coffee. Jr., Class ar: The Dilenna of the
Mass Tort Class Action. 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344, 1355-58 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars].
In particular, Professor Schuck describes the change in judicial attitude as "institutional evolutionism." which
he characterizes as judges' incremental building of systems for efficiently processing mass torts through a
common law approach that chooses among competing institutional designs. Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An
Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941. 944 (1995). Perhaps the best characteriza-
tion of the historical record comes from Professor Yeazell, who noted that "[a] legal culture uncertain about
the role of individualism and the desirability of collectivization demonstrates its uncertainty in halting, side-
ways moves toward collectivization and in large compensating gestures toward individualization." Stephen
Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 55-56.
For additional views of the history of mass tort actions, see John C. Coffee, Jr.. The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation]; Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson. Un-
derstanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993); Judith
Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement. and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918 (1995); see generally JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS. CONSOLIDA-
TIONS. AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995).
See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
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denying class certification using rationales that are highly reminiscent of the
first phase of mass tort class actions.
Courts have thus come full circle on the class action issue because they
have proved unable to resolve the tension between the historical inclination to
provide individualized justice and the need to employ effective aggregative
techniques to settle these proceedings. Understanding this evolutionary cycle
is important because the problems and difficulties this tension created all fit
neatly into the basic principles of core theory. Those principles underlie any
attempt to form a stable coalition, like a global class resolution. Indeed, it is
because of the inability to resolve-and sometimes even to articulate-the
problem of core that the law of class actions has experienced its circular evo-
lution.
In the first phase of mass tort evolution the courts' most significant con-
cern was whether class actions were ever appropriate in cases alleging signifi-
cant personal injuries. Analysis of that question at first typically began and
ended with consideration of the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23(b)(3). 9
The Committee quite clearly contemplated that "mass accident" cases would
not likely be amenable to class action treatment.'0 These admonitions were
See cases cited infa note 14.
The Advisory Committee note states:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a
class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liabil-
ity and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individual in different ways. In these
circumstances, a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendments (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Unit-
ed States, III F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953); Jack B. Weinstein, Revisions of Procedure: Some Problems in
Class Actions. 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 469 (1960)): see Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Con-
mittee: 1966 Amendnments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 393 (1967). In-
terestingly, Judge Weinstein, one of the leading judicial proponents of mass tort class actions, has repudiated
the Buffalo Law Review article the Advisory Committee cites. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.,
129 B.R. 710. 806 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Weinstein. J.). vacated on other grounds. 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1992), modified 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); WEINSTEIN. supra note 4, at 135.
Arguably, this admonition about "mass accidents" may be read to apply only to airplane crashes or
other single event disasters, and not to product liability cases, such as those involving asbestos, DES, or
breast implants. See Spencer Williams. Mass Tort Class Actions: Going. Going. Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324
n.l (1983). Many courts, however, have found that mass exposure cases are poorer candidates for class treat-
ment than mass accident cases. See, e.g.. In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1084-85 (6th Cir.
1996), Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.. 855 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988): hI re N. Dist. Cal.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Dalkon Shield];
Caruso v. Celsius Insulation Resources, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 530, 536 (M.D. Pa. 1984); Mertens v. Abbott
Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38, 41-42 (D.N.H. 1983); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566, 571 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
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consistent with Rule 23(b)(3)'s general focus on individuality. The notes to
Rule 23(b)(3) indicate that cases that might have otherwise been susceptible
to a collectivist approach (because of multiplicity of suits, common questions
or the like) may be inappropriate for class certification because the putative
class members may have an overriding interest in maintaining control over
their own actions." This view reflects the traditional notion that a strong
system of litigative autonomy represents a preferred method for resolving
some categories of cases, particularly tort cases. 2 Plaintiffs who have alleg-
edly suffered severe personal injuries are entitled under this view to control
their own litigation and to pursue a particularized adjudication through a trial
against an individual defendant. 3
Initially, most courts followed the Advisory Committee's views and largely
denied class action treatment in any kind of mass tort case. 4 The importance
Moreover. some evidence suggests that the Advisory Committee sought to preclude entirely the use of class
actions in mass tort cases. See Resnik, supra note 4, at 923: but see Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 745 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting statement of Professor Wright, a member of the Advisory Com-
mittee, that no total ban was contemplated, but that the Committee viewed the class action as "a complex
device that must be used with discernment").
" Any court evaluating whether to certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) should consider "the
interests of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions."
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3)(A). This interest "may be so strong as to call for denial of a class action." FED. R.
CIv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note: see Resnik, supra note 4, at 923.
'2 See WEINSTEIN. supra note 4. at I: Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice. Mass Torts, and
"Settlement Class Actions"- An Introductian, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 814-15 (1995): David Rosenberg,
Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561. 566 n.25
(1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Individual Jttice] see also Roger H. Transgrud. Joinder Alternatives in
Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 820 (1985).
" See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem. Prods.. Inc.. 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1138-47 (1995); Richard L. Marcus. They Can't Do That. Can They? Tort Reform,
Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 889-90 (1995); David Rosenberg, Of End Gaines and Openings in
Mass Tort Cases: Lessonsfion a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 701 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenberg.
End Gaines]; Schuck. supra note 4. at 976-78: Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Torl Cases: A
Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 74-76: Williams, supr'a note 10. at 329-30; Yeazell. supra note 4. at 47-
49; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 262-63 (1986).
" See. e.g.. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court. 523 F.2d 1083. 1085-86 (9th Cir.
1975) (noting that Rule 23 does not "permit certifications of a class whose members have independent tort
claims arising out of the same occurrence and whose representatives assert only liability for damages"); In ire
Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Cantso. 101 F.R.D. at 536; Sanders v. Tailored
Chem. Corp.. 570 F. Supp. 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 93 F.R.D. 875. 878
(D.S.D. 1982); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.. 68
F.R.D. 500, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1975): Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Daye v. Penn-
sylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973); Hobbs v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970) see also Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 407
N.Y.S.2d 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Snyder v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y.
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of individual control over litigation involving personal injuries was typically a
significant consideration in these decisions."5 It was also suggested that indi-
vidual issues relevant to liability would tend to overwhelm any common
factual or legal issues that might exist, thereby diminishing the efficacy of
collective treatment. 6
From this consistent rejection in the 1970s and early 1980s, courts moved
to a second phase that corresponded closely with the burgeoning of asbestos
and other mass tort litigation. Beginning in the mid-1980s, courts began to be
increasingly willing to certify mass tort class actions. 7 As courts began to
process large numbers of individual mass tort cases, they also began to see
advantages in class action collectivist procedures." In part, the movement
toward class action treatment was driven by the siege mentality generated in
some courts that were overwhelmed with asbestos or other mass tort litiga-
tion.'9 This change in attitude was also driven by recognition that mass tort
Sup. Ct. 1980); but see In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rejected b" McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 523 F.2d 1083.
Collective treatment was accomplished through other aggregative techniques, such as consolidation
and bankruptcy. See Resnik, supra note 4. at 925-30. Judith Resnik, Front "Cases'" to "Litigation ". 54 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991); Yeazell, supra note 4, at 64-68.
" See. e.g., Caruso, 101 F.R.D. at 537; Causey v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392,
399 (E.D. Va. 1975); Yaodle, 65 F.R.D. at 569; Hobbs, 50 F.R.D. at 79; cf In re Tetracicline, 107 F.R.D.
at 732 (noting the importance of individual control but suggesting that the relatively small injuries that class
members allegedly suffered undercut the need for such control).
" See, e.g., Caruso, 101 F.R.D. at 535-36; Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38, 40-41 (D.N.H.
1983); McEhaney. 93 F.R.D. at 880; R)yan, 84 F.R.D. at 233; see also hi re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that individual issues would warrant denial of class certifi-
cation but presence of government contractor defense created a common issue appropriate for class certifica-
tion); In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting existence of individ-
ual issues but declining to issue writ of mandamus directing district court to vacate certification).
" See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1344-45; Hensler & Peterson. supra note 4. at 1056-57.
' See hi re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1009 (3d Cir. 1986) (doting that "the trend has
been for courts to be more receptive to use of the class action in mass tort litigation"): WEINSTEIN, stipra
note 4, at I; Hensler & Peterson, supra note 4, at 965-69. See also In re Agent Orange Prods. Liability
Litig.. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), mandamus deniedsub non. hi re United States, 733 F.2d 10 (2d
Cir. 1984). and appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 389
(D. Mass. 1979) (granting conditional class certification), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983); Cause,
66 F.R.D. at 397 (denying class action certification but noting that class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) might
be appropriate if certain conditions were present). See generally 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDER-
AL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1805 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1996); Williams, supra note 10, at 335; Scott
0. Wright & Joseph A. Colussi, The Successfid Use of the Class Action Device in the Management of Sky-
ivalk Tort Litigation. 52 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 141 (1984); Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases
Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV. 114 (1983).
" See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4, at 1350 n.23, 1363-64; see also Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.,
782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). Professor Coffee is critical of these courts because he sees their decisions
1997]
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cases were in fact good candidates for collectivized procedures because the
cases often had significant overlapping issues; particularly with respect to
general causation, failure to warn, and the like.20 Moreover, the multiple re-
petitive trials that mass torts engendered not only created significant transac-
tion costs for litigants,2 but also imposed significant costs on the civil jus-
tice system, such as the delay costs imposed on other would-be litigants. -'
The vast majority of mass tort class actions in the second phase were certi-
fied as Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions which permit, typically without
any limitation, claimants to opt out to pursue an individualized resolution. -'
Again, permitting opt-outs was a significant gesture toward the more tradi-
tional individualized model of tort adjudication, and Rule 23(b)(3) certifica-
tion demonstrated the reluctance of courts to move from that historical model.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that in certain circumstances the
right to opt out of a class action to pursue a separate, individualized lawsuit
may be an element of constitutional due process. 24
to grant class certification as little more than self-interested attempts to eliminate the "mind-numbing bore-
dom" of presiding over these cases. Coffee. Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1351. Courts' decisions on proce-
dural matters may be driven in part by self-interest. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences. Public Choice,
and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 629 (1994). Janet C. Alexander, Judges' Rational
Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Commeat on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 647-48 (1994). But multi-
ple trials on substantially similar issues do in fact impose real costs on the civil litigation system. See hi re
Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 722-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub non. in
re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.. 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), and aff'd. 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643 (1985). A
significant rationale for class treatment is to alleviate these costs. See General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 155 (1982); Califano v. Yamaski. 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979).
" See Coffee, Class Wats. supra note 4. at 1363-64.
The most frequently cited figure is from a Rand Corporation study of asbestos litigation which
calculates that transaction costs accounted for $0.61 of each asbestos litigation dollar. See JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 40 (1983); Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4, at 1348
n.15.
22 See Newman. supra note 19, at 1649.
21 See FED R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). In many class actions, plaintiffs are provided with two opportunities to
opt out: (1) under Rule 23(b)(3) when the class is certified, and (2) a "back-end" opt-out if the claimant is
unsatisfied with an award made through any claims resolution facility created as part of a class action settle-
ment. See Schuck. supra note 4, at 963-64.
:' See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The Shutns decision is far from clear on
whether and to what extent opt-out rights are a necessary part of all class actions. See Arthur Miller & Da-
vid Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Actions Afier Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96
YALE L.J. I. 52 (1985) (noting that "[t]here is no neat and logical means of resolving the question whether
mandatory actions survive Shunts"); see also Coffee, Class W.ars, supra note 4, at 1382 n.143. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Matsushita Electrical & Ind strial Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996), con-
tained two quite different views of Shuts. The majority opinion interpreted Shuts to hold that "due process
for class action plaintiffs requires 'notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation,'"
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Preserving a mechanism that allows class members to exit from the collec-
tive, however, may create real difficulties in reaching a global settlement in
mass litigation. To be sure, rational apathy or economic reality might keep
many claimants in the class action. But a large flight of high-stakes litigants
from the class could threaten the viability of the class by destroying its ability
to provide the defendant with global peace." Significant opt-outs also ame-
liorate many of the transaction costs savings derived from eliminating multi-
ple trials.2 ' In large mass tort cases, aggregative treatment not only helps to
distribute access to civil dispute resolution, it also allocates the defendants'
with no mention of opt-out rights. Matsushita, 116 S. Ct. at 880 (quoting Shuts. 472 U.S. at 812). By con-
trast, a separate opinion by Justice Ginsburg stressed that the Shutts opinion "listed minimal procedural due
process requirements a class action money judgment must meet if it is to bind absentees; those requirements
include notice, an opportunity to be heard, a right to opt out, and adequate representation." Id. at 888
(Ginsburg, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
An argument can be made that Shntts does not hold that opt-out rights are required in every class
action. Rather, a close reading of Shtts demonstrates that the court employed the opt-out right as a form of
fictional consent to address a personal jurisdiction issue that might have prevented class certification. See
Shutts. 472 U.S. at 806. Shuts can be read as requiring opt-out rights only for out-of-state plaintiffs that
lack minimum contacts with the forum jurisdiction in a Rule 23(b)(3) case. See. e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink
Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1573 (3d Cir. 1994); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386,
391-92 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992).
Under this view, Shuits is not an impediment to mandatory class treatment- instead it suggests the impor-
tance of pragmatism and flexibility in resolving doctrinal legal questions in the context of class actions. See
In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Weinstein, J.) (noting that Shutns "suggest[s] the
need for modified jurisdictional analysis in the special context of mass litigation"), appeal dismised, 7 F.3d
20 (2d Cir. 1993). Because national class actions are necessary to provide relief where it might otherwise be
unattainable, Shut/s adopted a lower standard of "minimal procedural due process" to replace minimum con-
tacts. I re DES. 789 F. Supp. at 576. The reliance on opt-out rights was a manifestation of the "time-hon-
ored jurisdiction stretching technique of implied consent to cope with the special problem of jurisdiction in
mass class actions .... Id. at 577.
In any event, even this more limited reading of Shutts may have important implications for class
action dynamics to the extent it creates opportunities for some, but not all, class members to opt out of the
class. See infra Part IV.
2' See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that in settlement negotiations
defendant insisted on a non-opt-out class action because "it was unwilling to pay billions in settlement and
forego its substantial arguments ... without the assurance that it did not face unknown liabilities in the
future"); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.. No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12521. at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (noting that number of opt-outs "raises the specter that one
or more defendants may elect to withdraw from the settlement in view of risks and costs of potential litiga-
tion with these claimants").
2' See hI re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764, 779 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting trial court's
determination in Rule 23(b)(I)(B) class action that allowing one group of litigants to opt out would destroy
"delicate balancing of interests" that settlement reflected); see also Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160
F.R.D. 478. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1995). cert. granted sub noa. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379
(1996); WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 26, 136 n.108 (arguing that the right to opt out "may make full use of
the class action device impossible"); Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV.
429, 449 (1986).
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scarce assets.27 Large-scale litigation thus involves two different kinds of
common pool or "tragedy of the commons 28 effects. On a macro level,
many of the costs associated with multiple, repetitive trials are externalities
from the perspective of the class action attorneys, litigants, or individual
courts. A significant collective action problem arises because parties in mass
tort cases have little incentive to advocate collectivist strategies that might
limit the costs of individualization. These claimants might oppose collective
processes if they interfere with a disaggregative strategy that is individually
beneficial to them. 9 Individual litigants and their attorneys may not rational-
ly care that trying a series of overlapping or identical tort cases might require
a significantly greater expenditure of time on the part of the judiciary than
would resolution through a class action because such individuals may not
bear the full costs of individual trials. Similarly, they may not care that such
a disaggregative procedure might prevent or delay other litigants from utiliz-
ing the civil justice system.
On the level of the individual case, a defendant's assets are a common pool
from which all injured claimants must obtain their recoveries. In many class
2' See General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982); Cramton. supra note 12. at 817;
Courtland H. Peterson & Joachim Zekoll, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 79, 97 (1994). In mass tort cases.
efficiency concerns are the most common justification for class action treatment. See. e.g., Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188. 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988).
2' See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 34. 316-17 (1994); ROBERT GIB-
BONS. GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 27-29 (1992); Garrett Hardin. The Tragedy ofthe Coln-
mons. 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
-' The disaggregative approach appears to be one of two dominant strategies that prevail in the plain-
tiffs' mass tort bar. This strategy relies in part on the ability of a plaintiffs' firm to impose substantial
costs on the defendants. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1364-65; Joseph Nocem, Fatal Litigation,
FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 60. For example, in one attempt to certify a class of Dalkon Shield claimants.
all but one of the 166 plaintiffs' counsel opposed certification. See Yeazell, supra note 4. at 58.
Rational individual strategies might encourage litigants to multiply the expenses associated with nu-
merous individual actions. Defendants. for example, might choose the common strategy of "divide and con-
quer." or might prefer that plaintiffs have to wait in long docket queues for a trial because the prospect of a
long delay might encourage plaintiffs to settle cheaply. Or, defendants may calculate that the total number of
claimants will be fewer without a class action because suits by small claimants or those with weak claims
may not be economically viable. Individual plaintiffs or their attorneys might expect a greater recovery or
fee award in an individual case. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation. supra note 4. at 908-10; Rosenberg,
Individual Justice. supra note 12, at 581-82; Yeazell. supra note 4, at 58.
Other attorneys pursue an aggregative approach that seeks to benefit from being named to a lucrative
position as the lead counsel, or as an attorney on the plaintiffs' steering committee, or by settling large in-
ventories of individual cases. See In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145. 165 (2d Cir. 1987);
Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentiun Papers: A Case Stiulty of Collective Institutional
Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 U. ARIZ. L. REV. 559. 601-02 (1996); see also Coffee. Class Wars. snpra
note 4. at 1364-65; Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 4, at 911-12; Nocera, supra at 60.
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actions those assets will be more than sufficient to satisfy all claims. A signif-
icant portion of mass tort cases, however, may involve damages that test the
limits of those assets. Common pool problems arise when competing claim-
ants have potentially overlapping interests and where acquisition creates an
absolute priority of ownership." In such cases, some individual claimants
may impose significant externalities on other litigants through pursuit of
disaggregative strategies. In a class action, opting out of the aggregative pro-
cedure to pursue individual adjudication may permit individual litigants to
obtain a disproportionately large portion of those assets. Individual litigants
seeking to maximize their own recoveries are not likely to care that costly
individual litigation might deplete a defendant's assets and thereby diminish
other claimants' recoveries.3
The third phase in the mass tort evolutionary cycle was characterized by
judicial attempts to overcome these problems through the use of mandatory
classes. Such classes significantly enhance the possibility of avoiding the
inequitable allocation of assets that may arise from pursuit of disaggregative
strategies,32 and they obviously allow defendants to obtain global resolution
of disputes, thereby facilitating settlement efforts.33 But mandatory classes
also represent a much greater move away from individualization and have
typically come up against much greater resistance than opt-out class actions.
In large part, mandatory class actions in mass tort cases have been relegated
to the procedural hinterlands. Only a few courts have been willing to certify
such actions, and precious few of these decisions have been upheld on ap-
peal.3
The theoretical basis for mandatory class actions is much different from
opt-out class actions and individualized tort cases. The same focus on individ-
ual control that makes opt-out rights necessary under Rule 23(b)(3) is absent
from, and indeed is antithetical to, the reasons for class certification under
Rule 23(b)(1). In (b)(1) cases, it is appropriate to diminish individual control
because aggregation is based on necessity, not consent." Subdivision (b)(1)
See Randal C. Picker, Securit
, 
Interests. Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645,
647 (1992).
" See hi re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992).
32 See Cutler v. 65 Sec. Plan, 831 F. Supp. 1008, 1021*(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Weinstein, J.).
"' See id. at 1020; WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 135-36.
' See cases cited infra notes 38. 48.
. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
240-66 (1987). Rule 23(b)(3) is not strictly a consent-based aggregative procedure. By incorporating the
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actions were envisioned for situations in which allowing opt-outs would cre-
ate the risk of systematic unfairness to other class members. 6 By contrast,
opt-out rights are required in a (b)(3) action because it is only those actions
in which the interests of the individuals in pursuing their own lawsuits may
be so strong as to outweigh the necessity of unitary adjudication.37
The major difficulty for courts that attempted to certify mass tort cases as
mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) was finding a way to convert a
collection of tort claims that would historically be subject to individual adju-
dication into the kind of class action that would be amenable to a non-opt-out
class. 38 In other words, courts needed an analytical hook that would over-
come the focus on individuality found in Rule 23(b)(3). Thus, the history of
mass tort mandatory class actions has been predominantly the search for the
doctrinal justification for employing subdivision (b)(1)'s solution to the col-
lective action problem that can arise when a multitude of individualized dam-
age claims are asserted against a defendant.
That search led most often to the limited fund doctrine. Traditionally, a
limited fund was thought of as a readily identifiable, specific, limited sum of
money upon which numerous claims existed that exceeded the amount of the
fund.39 Unitary adjudication was appropriate to prevent an inequitable distri-
adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). the drafters also incorporated notions of collectiv-
ism based on representation. See generally YEAZELL, supra, at 250-55.
, See YEAZELL, supra note 35, at 256-57: Robert G. Bone. Personal and Inpensonal Litigative
FornL': Reconceiving the Histoiy" of Adjudicative Representation. 70 B.U. L. REV. 213. 298 n,203 (1990).
'; See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee's note.
' A number of courts have discussed the issue. See. e.g.. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.. 109 F.R.D. 269,
274-77 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig.. 104 F.R.D. 422
(E.D. Pa. 1984). modified, 107 F.R.D. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1985), afj'd in part and rev'd in part. 789 F.2d 996
(3d Cir. 1986); hI re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.
1982); Dalkon Shield, 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal.), modified, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacat-
ed, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Cobur v. 4-R Corp.. 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977). mandamus denied
sub not. Union Light. Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978):
Hemandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward. 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973). aff'd. 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir.). and
affd, 507 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1975).
" See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, § 1774: see. e.g.. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 472 U.S.
797, 820 (1985); ht re Dennis Greenman See. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11 th Cir. 1987): In re Bendectin
Prods. Liab. Litig.. 749 F.2d 300, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1984) Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d
1335, 1340 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976); Cutler 831 F. Supp. at 1020-21; County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407, 1417 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Alexander Grant & Co. v. McAlister, 116 F.R.D. 583, 590
(S.D. Ohio 1987). Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 595-96 (E.D. Wash. 1986). A mandatory
class under subdivision (b)(I)(B) is appropriate in such cases because:
[Vol. 46
MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS
bution of the fund whereby claimants who had the good fortune of having an
early resolution of their claims receive a full recovery while later claimants
receive only partial or even no recovery. Implicit in this rationale is the no-
tion that a single, mandatory action permits the court to make an equitable,
pro rata distribution such that each claimant would receive something less
than a full recovery so that all eligible claimants could receive some recov-
ery." Courts experimenting with mandatory classing in the mass tort context
extended the limited fund concept to cases where the claims against the de-
fendant exceeded or might exceed its assets or the limits of insurance poli-
cies.4 ' As in traditional limited fund cases, mandatory classing was deemed
necessary to prevent a "race to the courthouse," in which the first claimants
to prosecute their claims would be able to recover while later claimants re-
ceived only "worthless judgments."42 Reconceptualizing a mass tort case as a
limited fund case allowed the courts to change their focus from the impor-
tance of individual litigative autonomy to the "the collective best interests of
all parties concerned.""
Where defendants' assets were likely in excess of claims, courts seeking to
create a mandatory class sometimes attempted to certify only particular issues,
such as punitive damages, for mandatory treatment." Under the so-called
"punitive damages overkill" theory,45 punitive damages were said to repre-
sent a limited fund because state law or due process prevents a defendant
an adjudication as to one or more membrs of the class will necessarily or probably have an
adverse practical effect on the interests of other members who should therefore be represented in
the lawsuit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund
insufficient to satisfy all claims. A class action by or against representative members to settle the
validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount of each
valid claim and proportionate distribution of the fund, meets the problem.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(l)(B) advisory committee's note.
See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 986 (5th Cir. 1996).
4' See In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Aheam v. Fibreboard, Civ. Act. No.
6:93cv526. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11523, at *15-37 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 1995); In re Federal SkAlvalk. 93
F.R.D. at 424; Cohurn, 77 F.R.D. at 45 (noting that claims asserted in suits on file exceeded the defen-
dant's assets); Hernandez, 61 F.R.D. at 561 n.8. see also William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort
Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 840 (1995); Williams. supra note 10. at 326.
. Coburn, 77 F.R.D. at 45.
In re Federal SkIvalk, 93 F.R.D. at 423: see Williams, supra note 10, at 332.
4 See i re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. at 434-38; In re Federal S.vwalk, 93 F.R.D. at 424-25;
Dalkon Shield, 521 F. Supp. at 1192-94. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(A) permits a court to
certify a specified subset of issues for class certification.
" The phrase derives from Judge Friendly's opinion in Roginskr v. Richardson-Merrell. hic.. 378
F.2d 832, 839 n.l (2d Cir. 1967).
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from paying an unlimited amount of such damages.46 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) treat-
ment was appropriate in order to assure that each plaintiff would have an
equal opportunity to receive an equitable portion of those punitive damages,
rather than all or most of the potential punitive damages going to the first
plaintiffs to bring their cases to trial.47
Most of the attempts to certify mandatory mass tort class actions were
reversed on appeal.48 Mandatory classes were not found to be improper as a
matter of law, and some courts even commended district court judges for
their innovative attempts to employ mandatory classes.49 Still, most appellate
courts seemed quite uncomfortable with the idea of the completely collectiv-
ized procedure mandatory classes represented. These courts seemed to contin-
ue to view the claimants as a collection of individuals with separate tort
claims, not as individuals competing to recover from the same pool of assets.
This discomfort is most clearly seen in the unreasonably high hurdles some
appellate courts established for finding the existence of a limited fund."°
Some decisions certifying subdivision (b)(1) classes were not reversed, most
" See /i re Federal Skwalk. 93 F.R.D. at 424-25.
47 See id.
" See In re School Asbestos Litig.. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); it re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig.,
749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); it re Federal Skywalk Cases,
680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982). Appellate courts have often found that insufficient fact-finding accompanied
the decision to certify a mandatory class. See. e.g.. In re Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 306; Dalkon Shield. 693
F.2d at 852 (criticizing lower court for finding existence of limited fund without obtaining sufficient evi-
dence of Robins' net worth, earnings, or the extent of its insurance coverage). See also Payton v. Abbott
Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979) (noting that without evidence of likely insolvency. "numerous
plaintiffs and a large ad dammnn clause should [not] guarantee (b)(1)(B) certification").
Courts reversing Rule 23(b)(l) certifications raised other potential stumbling blocks as well. One
concern was the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state court proceedings
"except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to pro-
tect or effectuate its judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). To the extent that state cases were already pend-
ing when the court approved a mandatory federal court class action, the certification order could be seen as
an injunction of those state court proceedings. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1002: In re
Federal Skywalk, 680 F.2d at 1181-83. Courts also noted that in diversity actions "certification of a manda-
tory class raises serious questions of personal jurisdiction and intrusion into the autonomous operation of
state judicial systems." In re School Asbestos Litig.. 789 F.2d at 1002. Concerns about personal jurisdiction
raise questions about the scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Philips Petroleun Co. , Shiltts. 472
U.S. 797 (U.S. 1985); see supra note 24.
"o See In re Bendeclin, 749 F.2d at 307 (noting that "[o]n pure policy grounds, the district judge's
decision may be commendable") Dalkon Shield. 693 F.2d at 851 (recognizing that mandatory classes might
be appropriate in some mass tort cases); In re Federal Ski,walk, 680 F.2d at 1177 n.4, 1183 (noting the dis-
trict court's "legitimate concern for the efficient management of mass tort litigation" and commending the
court for its "creative efforts in attempting to achieve a fair, efficient and economical trial for victims").
" See. e.g.. Dalkon Shield. 693 F.2d at 851-52 (holding that mandatory class was only permitted
where record established that "separate damages awards inescapably will affect later awards").
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notably hI re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation5 and In re A.H.
Robins Co.,2 but these cases were hardly unequivocal endorsements of man-
datory classing."
Mass tort class actions have now entered a fourth phase in which district
courts continue to appreciate the benefits of mass tort class actions." Lower
courts have recently approved a number of innovative and controversial tech-
niques mass tort litigants have employed to help facilitate global class resolu-
tions. These techniques include settlement classes, in which an action, a re-
quest for class certification, and a proposed settlement are filed contempora-
neously; or classes limited to claimants whose injuries will only manifest, if
at all, in the future. One common thread running through these techniques is
that they decrease the likelihood that significant opt-outs will destroy the
viability of a global class resolution for the participating defendants.
" 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems.
Co.. 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), and aftd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
" 85 B.R. 373 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989)- see also Cobum v. 4-R Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977). mandamus deniedsub no,. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States
Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir 1978); Hemandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla.
1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir.). and aft'd, 507 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1975).
'" On mandamus, the Second Circuit did not overturn certification of a punitive damages mandatory
class. h re Dianond Shamrock, 725 F.2d at 862. On a later appeal of the class settlement, it refused to
address the propriety of the mandatory class. Instead, it upheld class certification only under Rule 23(b)(3),
and only because of the centrality of the government contractor defense. In re Agent Orange. 818 F.2d at
163-67. In A.H Robins, the company was in bankruptcy and the certification of a mandatpry class was up-
held on appeal in connection with a suit against the company's products liability insurance carrier. 880 F.2d
at 710. Certification of a mandatory class was part of a larger settlement agreement, and was unopposed by
defendants. Id. at 717-18. Moreover, the class was not purely mandatory because the claims resolution facil-
ity negotiated as part of the settlement provided a back-end opt-out right if a claimant was unsatisfied with
her award. Id. at 745.
More recently, other courts have given their approval to mandatory classes, although sometimes with
significant qualifications. A mandatory class was used in In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Ashestos Litig.. 129 B.R.
710, 806 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds. 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d
7 (2d Cir. 1993). That case was much closer to a traditional limited fund case because it involved the re-
structuring of a trust established to compensate asbestos claimants through filing and rapidly settling a man-
datory class action. Although the Second Circuit did not overturn certification of a mandatory class, it none-
theless vacated the lower court decision to approve the settlement because of its use of a (b)(I)(B) class
action without designating proper subclasses. 982 F.2d at 725. In addition, the Fifth Circuit upheld approval
of a settlement in another mandatory class action that also contained limited back-end opt-out rights. In re
Asbestos Litig. 90 F.3d 963, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1996). In upholding the settlement, the court noted that it pro-
vides "a simple process for injured persons to quickly obtain a fair resolution of their claims and at the same
time safeguard their ultimate right to resort to the tort system." Id.
w See Coffee. Class Wars. supra note 4, at 1345; Schuck. supra note 4, at 957-58.
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These recent responses to the dilemmas mass tort class actions create have
not fared terribly well in the appellate courts. Not only have many appellate
courts criticized these efforts, these courts have also reasserted much of their
original skepticism about the utility of mass tort class actions. 5 In four cases
since 1995, federal appeals courts have decertified class actions involving
HIV-infected blood products,56 asbestos,57 penile implants,5 and ciga-
rettes." In each of these cases the courts raised grave concerns about the
whether mass tort class actions, even those with opt-out rights, are appropri-
ate.' Many of these concerns are highly reminiscent of the concerns raised
in the first phase of mass tort litigation. For example, a number of these
courts stressed the multiplicity of individual issues that would likely exist if
the cases went to trial.12 The courts also expressed the importance of pre-
serving individualization, either through the maintenance of opt-out rights or
the denial of class certification in situations where opt-out rights would be
insufficient to preserve individualization.63
In short, the courts have in large part come full circle in their treatment of
mass tort class actions because the judiciary has proved unable to resolve the
tension between individual autonomy and the need for global resolution in the
" This view is by no means universal. See In re Asbestos Lilig.. 90 F.3d at 972-73 (upholding manda-
tory class action settlement), In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting
claim that class action settlement did not bind parties whose injuries allegedly did not manifest or were not
discovered until after opt-out date. and who therefore allegedly had no meaningful opportunity to exclude
themselves from the class).
in re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.). cert. denied. 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
' Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc.. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), ceri. granted sub non. Amchem Prods..
Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
I in re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080-82 (6th Cir. 1996).
' Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 741-51, Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626-34; American Med.. 75 F.3d at 1078-82.
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298-1304.
" Additionally. courts have begun to argue that class actions may be inappropriate in certain mass tort
cases because they magnify the defendant's stakes and thereby create inappropriate pressure on defendants
to settle meritless cases. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746; Rhone-Poldenc, 51 F.3d at 1298-1300.
'" See Castano. 84 F.3d at 741-45; Georgine. 83 F.3d at 626-34; American Med.. 75 F.3d at 1081.
" In Georgine, the Third Circuit erected higher barriers for obtaining class treatment in cases involv-
ing personal injuries or death. 83 F.3d at 627, 632 (noting that in such cases "[e]ach plaintiff has a signifi-
cant interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions"). Indeed, the court distinguished
an earlier case in which it had upheld certification of an opt-out class action, it re School Asbestos Litiga-
tion. 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986). because that case involved only property damage claims. Georglne,
83 F.3d at 627. The Georgine court was also troubled by the structure of the back-end opt-out rights con-
tained in the class action settlement, which it found to be "limited to a few persons per year." Id. at 630. For
discussion of the importance of preserving individualization see Castano, 84 F.3d at 738-39; Aterican Med.,
75 F.3d at 1084-85; Rhone-Poulenc. 51 F.3d at 1297.
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prosecution of these proceedings. At the heart of that tension lie the game
theoretic concepts of core that are discussed below. These concepts, which
have to date been absent from the academic literature on class actions, help to
explain many of the observed problems that the judiciary has addressed but
failed to solve.
III. THE THEORY OF CLASS ACTIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF CORE
The chaotic and evolving state of mass tort class action law has proved a
fertile ground for academia. Much of the rich academic literature that has
sprung up over the last decade has viewed opt-out rights as an important
check against attorney opportunism and other agency cost problems that can
arise in class litigation. To date, none of this literature has explored the appli-
cation of core theory to class actions and the problems associated with obtain-
ing a global resolution of class litigation while still preserving a means for
individual adjudication through opt-out rights. As discussed below, the aca-
demic assessment of opt-out rights would greatly benefit from core theoretic
principles. Core theory provides a powerful descriptive tool for the analysis
of class actions because it describes the conditions under which coalitions will
or will not tend to be stable.
A. The Academic Assessment of Opt-Out Rights
Over approximately the last decade, an economic analysis of class actions
has emerged that has demonstrated the significant agency cost problems that
can occur in class action litigation.' Briefly stated, this analysis has focused
on the significantly different incentives that can exist between an attorney and
the class members she represents. The limited ability of most class members
See Coffee. Class Wars, supra note 4; Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation. supra note 4; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987) [hereinafter
Coffee. Rethinking the Class Action]: John C. Coffee, Jr.. Understanding the Plaintif.fs Attornei: The In-
plications of Economic Theo for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorne.]; John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation. 48 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee, Unfaithful Champion]: Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommen-
dationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1991): see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Securities Class Action Settlements. 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1993); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving
Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 664-65 (1989).
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to monitor effectively the class attorney creates a situation in which the attor-
ney may act in her own best interests rather than in the best interests of her
clients. In short, the dynamics of class litigation create a situation where an
attorney can engage in opportunistic behavior to the detriment of the class.
This critique of class actions has strongly influenced analysis of the dilem-
ma that opt-out rights present. To be sure, many scholars recognize that a
pure individualized system of tort adjudication makes little sense in mass
torts.6" Indeed, there has been a great synergy between the academy and the
bench with respect to the tension between individual autonomy and aggrega-
tive class procedure. Like the courts, class action scholars recognize that the
ability to opt out may destroy the viability of a class action if the prospect of
obtaining large compensatory or punitive damages awards from sympathetic
juries drives large-stakes claimants from the class.' Scholars have also rec-
ognized that as a practical matter, the ability to opt out is unevenly distribut-
ed.67 Small claimants typically have no realistic opportunity to opt out of the
collective because their claims are unlikely to be economically viable as inde-
" See. e.g., Coffee, Class War'. supra note 4, at 1346 (arguing that "proposals for the return to a
traditional system of individual case litigation are apt to be as quixotic as they are costly"); Coffee, Entre-
preneurial Litigation, supra note 4, at 877 n.2; Cmmton. supra note 12, at 816; Resnik, supra note 4, at
925-26 (noting the general trend away from individualization toward aggregation); Schuck, supra note 4, at
980.
- See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective ResponsibililtY: The Dilenia of Mass
Tort Reform, 73 U. VA. L. REV. 845, 878 (1987). Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation:
Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation. 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475. 507 (1991);
Linda S. Mullenix. Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 1'039, 1066-67, 1072-73 (1986) [hereinafter Mullenix, Proposed Federal Procedure Act]; Rosenberg,
End Gantes. supra note 13, at 705 (noting that "even fully informed claimants may choose to opt out of an
adequate damage schedule for the expected gains of separate trial before an overly sympathetic jury"):
Schuck, supra note 4, at 965, 968.
Like the courts, scholars have recognized that if this effect is too extensive, then it may destroy the
benefits of any settlement for the defendant. See Schuck, supra note 4. at 963-65. Defendants in these cases
have come to expect that stronger claimants may seek to opt out and have sought to protect themselves
should the opt-outs become too numerous by inserting "walk-away" provisions in settlements. See In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-100000-S. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at
*17, *23. *65 (N.D. Ala. Sept. I. 1994): Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 325 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (noting that settlement provided that if too many plaintiffs opted out of the class, then the defendants
could walk away), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.). cert. granted sub non,. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
117 S. Ct. 379 (1996); Thomas M. Burton, Most Hemophiliacs Reject Settlenmentfiont Baxter, Bayer on
Infection Suit. WALL ST. J., May 14, 1996, at B6; see also Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4, at 1382 n. 144,
' Some commentators note that the importance of such rights will vary greatly with the type of litiga-
tion. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclain, Litigation: Should Rule 23 Be Revised?. 94
MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1255-58, 1264 (1996) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclain Litigation].
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pendent suits.6" Large claimants may then benefit from the class discovery
or trial preparation that may be more extensive than any individual litigant
could afford on its own. In effect, small claimants may subsidize large claim-
ants' individual suits and similarly situated plaintiffs may receive substantial-
ly different recoveries.69
Nonetheless, the significant agency cost and collective action problems that
can exist in class actions have led a number of scholars to suggest that opt-
out rights serve important instrumental, as well as normative and symbolic,
functions. Scholars have argued that opt-out rights can serve as a market
check on the fairness and adequacy of class action global settlements that
may limit the opportunities for class counsel to "sell out" the class for a sig-
nificant fee award.70 This market-checking function is thought to be a vital
protection against attorney opportunism or collusion.7' To limit opportunistic
opt-outs, various scholars suggest restricting opt-outs. These proposals typi-
cally involve taxing class action discovery costs to opt-outs or limiting attor-
ney's fees in individual actions to the difference between the individual re-
covery and what the recovery would have been in the class action.
' See Cramton, supra note 12. at 824.
See Abraham, supra note 66, at 878: Rosenberg, End Games. supra note 13, at 702; Schuck. supra
note 4, at 942-43 & n.6.
See Rosenberg, End Games. supra note 13, at 705; Schuck, supra note 4, at 964.
" Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4, at 1382-83. Cramton, supra note 12, at 825-26: Koniak, supra
note 13, at 1137-51; Marcus, supra note 13, at 889-90: Rabin, supra note I, at 1044; Rosenberg, Individual
Justice, supra note 12. at 594: Schuck, supra note 4. at 963-68.
" See. e.g., Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation. supra note 4, at 925-30: Mullenix, Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, supra note 66, at 1066-67, 1072-73; Rosenberg, End Games, supra note 13, at 705-06. 714-
15; Rubin, supra note 26, at 449.
Currently, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has proposed a number of significant changes to
Rule 23. See Bruce D. Brown, Rules Panel Taking Second Look at Class Action Reforms, THE RECORD,
Feb. 4, 1997, at 5. Although not contained in the latest draft, some prior proposed revisions sought to limit
opportunistic opt-outs. In this prior version, the Advisory Committee proposed to abolish subdivisions
(b)(I), (b)(2), and (b)(3) in favor of a unitary standard that combines the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) with
the requirement of subdivision (b)(3) that the class action be superior to other available methods of adjudica-
tion. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a)-(b) (on file with author). Once
a class is certified, the court would be required to determine whether to permit opt-out rights based on.
among other things, the extent and nature of the members' injuries, the potential conflicts among class
members, the interest of the defendant in securing a final resolution of the controversy, and the inefficiency
or impracticality of separate actions to resolve the controversy. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 23(c) (on file with author). The Advisory Committee stressed that questions about
opt-out rights "should be addressed on their own merits, given the needs and circumstances of the particular
case and without being tied artificially to the particular classification of the class action." Edward H. Cooper,
Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 58 (1996).
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Scholars have also suggested that the ability to opt out may ameliorate
some of the harm that can befall high-stakes claimants from the adverse se-
lection effects that may draw weak claimants to the class action.7" This anal-
ysis suggests that claimants with weak or nonmeritorious claims who want to
obtain some recovery from the defendant will tend to seek that recovery
through the class action rather than an individual action because they hope
that, despite the deficiencies in their causes of action, they may still be able
to recover from a global settlement of all claims. 4 In essence, these claim-
ants seek to become lost in the class action crowd. The presence of weak
claims may drive down the average expected recovery for all claimants,75
thereby harming those with above average claims because they will tend to
recover an amount less than they could expect to obtain in an individual ac-
tion.76 Opt-out rights allow these claimants to avoid this problem.77
From a normative perspective, opt-out rights preserve traditional notions of
individual justice by "institutionaliz[ing] and enlarg[ing] the central value of
claimant autonomy."" The right to exclude oneself is said to dynamically
balance the "competing interests in aggregating and individualizing claims,"
thereby allowing each claimant to choose "the particular mix of collective and
individual claiming that best serves her wishes."79 While the reality of mass
This proposal also would have permitted courts to place certain conditions on class members who
choose to opt out. Indeed, these conditions might have been quite onerous. Among other things, the court
would have been permitted to prohibit any class member who opts out of the class from pursuing the same
cause of action against the defendant, which effectively amounts to mandatory certification. The court could
also have prohibited opt-outs from obtaining any res judicata or collateral estoppel benefit from any class
action judgment or could have taxed class action discovery costs against any opt-outs. As will be seen, these
conditions can be a crucial determinant in maintaining a stable condition and thereby in creating the poten-
tial for realizing the benefits of class aggregation.
" See Coffee. Entrepreneurial Litigation. supra note 4, at 906-07, Schuck. supra note 4. at 961. see
also George A. Akerlof. The Market for "Lemnons " Quiality Uncertaini, and the Market Mechanis,. 84 Q.
J. ECON. 488 (1970). -Adverse selection now refers to any situation in which an individual has knowledge
about his own quality (the goods he sells, his ability to perform, his health status) while whomever he is
dealing with knows only about the characteristics of the average members of the group." VICTOR C.
GOLDBERG, Intr-oduction to READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (Victor C. Goldberg ed..
1989). In other words, adverse selection is a problem of asymmetric information. See PAUL MILGROM &
JOHN ROBERTS. ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 150 (1992). lan Ayres, Playing Gaines i,it,
the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291. 1308 (1990).
" See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 4, at 906-07; see also In re Agent Orange Prods.
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987).
See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 4. at 917.
See id. at 916-17.
77 See id. at 906-07: see also Ayres. supra note 73, at 1307.
79 Schuck. supra note 4, at 964; see Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaitn Litigation. supra note 67, at
1256.
7. Schuck, supra note 4, at 964; see Heather M. Johnson, Note, Resohtion ofMas. Prohuci Liability
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tort adjudication is often far removed from the paradigm of the lawyer zeal-
ously advocating a single client's claim before a neutral judge and a jury of
her peers, the notion that this paradigm still exists has a strong symbolic con-
tent. 0
This view of opt-out rights has resulted in a large amount of highly critical
commentary with respect to some of the recent innovations in mass tort class
actions that are seen as limiting the practical ability of class members to opt
out of the litigation. In particular, settlement class actions have come under
intense scrutiny." A number of scholars have pointed out ,that these kinds of
cases are rife with the potential for attorney opportunism or collusion. Settle-
ment classes, particularly those involving future claimants, may give defen-
dants ample opportunity to negotiate with friendly plaintiff's attorneys and
arrive at sweetheart settlements. 2 Future claimants may have no present in-
centive to opt out if they are unaware of the extent to which they have been
injured or even that they have been exposed at all to the allegedly harmful
product.83 The opportunity to obtain a significant fee award for successfully
negotiating such a settlement creates the possibility of a "race to the bottom"
among plaintiffs attorneys as each seeks to be more amenable to a cheaper
settlement. 4 Various kinds of delayed or back-end opt-out rights have been
promoted as necessary protections to allow future claimants to evaluate mean-
ingfully the adequacy of any settlement and to prevent them from being
"uniquely disadvantaged" by mass tort class actions.85
Litigation Within the Federal Rules: A Case for the hicreased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2329, 2357 (1996).
" See Rosenberg, End Gaies, supra note 13, at 701-02 (arguing that collective processing does not
deprive individuals of actual control over litigation because they have no such control in nonaggregated
cases); Schuck. supra note 4, at 976-78: see also Cutler v. 65 Sec. Plan. 831 F. Supp. 1008. 1020 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (the right to opt out "gives [an] individual a sense that his individual rights are preserved because he
can proceed in a separate lawsuit."); hI re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.. 129 B.R. 107. 802 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds. 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1993).
" See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1378-82; Cramton, supra note 12, at 823-36: Koniak.
supra note 13.
43 See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1378-82; see also John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class
Action. 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1222 (1995): but see Rosenberg. Individual Justice, supra note 12, at 569-70
(suggesting possibility for increased use of mandatory classing); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the Court in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEo. L.J. 1389, 1390-91 (1985) (noting need for "a single forum for basic decision
making" in mass tort cases).
" See Cramton, supra note 12. at 835-36; see also In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig.. 996 F.2d
1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that benefits of providing opt-out rights to future claimants were "conjec-
tural at best").
See Coffee, Class Wars. supra note 4. at 1378-82.
' Id. at 1350; see Cramton. supra note 12, at 835-36; Schuck, supra note 4, at 967. For cases em-
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Similar criticisms are lodged against mandatory classes, which are thought
to be particularly problematic precisely because class members do not have
the option of escaping from a collusive or inadequate settlement by opting
out. High-stakes claimants are said to be most affected in these cases because
they are the only claimants for whom opting out is an economically viable
option. 6 Thus, it has been suggested that mandatory classes provide defen-
dants with a mechanism to settle the claims of high-stakes claimants cheap-
ly.8
7
The academic assessment of class actions is quite powerful. Class actions
surely do provide significant opportunities for attorney opportunism and other
agency cost problems. This analysis, however, leaves open the question of
whether the observed problems in class litigation can be explained without
resort to claims of agency problems, market failure, or other procedural im-
perfections. The theory of the core provides just such a unifying explanation.
B. The Theory of the Core
What is the theory of the core and what does it add to the current academic
assessment of class actions? What insights can it bring to the difficult task of
balancing individual autonomy and global resolution in class litigation?
To begin to answer these questions, it is best to start with a simple applica-
tion of core theory called the "Majority Voting Game."88 Consider a society
with three members, A, B, and C. In this society, any majority of two players
has the ability to exercise 100% of the political power. Consequently, if the
third person is not a member of a unanimous ruling coalition it will have no
political power. For example, suppose that A and B agree to share power
equally. That coalition would leave C powerless. What can we predict C will
do in this situation? C can obtain some share of the political power by offer-
ing to form a coalition with B in which B will have a larger share of the
power than it would in the coalition with A (say 60%) while C gets the re-
maining 40%. Both B and C should agree to form such a coalition because
ploying such an opt-out scheme, see In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 745 (4th Cir. 1989); hi re Sili-
cone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.. No. Civ. 92-P-100000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. I, 1994); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 166 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
See Coffee. Class Wars; supra note 4, at 1382.
, See id. at 1382-83.
This example is taken from ROY GARDNER, GAMEs FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 395-97, 400-01
(1995).
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both would be better off than they would be under the original coalitional
structure. As a result, B should defect from the coalition with A when faced
with this proposal.
The Majority Voting Game places no constraints on defections or on the
number of times coalitions can form. As a result, it is reasonable to expect
that this same process should repeat itself, this time with A, who has been
left powerless, taking the lead. A can now turn around and offer either B or
C an even greater share of power than they currently possess to entice them
into a ruling coalition with A. As should now be readily apparent, the Majori-
ty Voting Game has no stable solution. That is, there is no coalition that can
form that will make each party better off than some other coalition that could
be formed. In this game, coalitions will tend to break up and re-form unless
some other constraint is placed on them.
The Majority Voting Game is analogous to a class action. In both cases a
player must choose whether to remain part of a given coalition. In a class
action, the coalition is simply the class itself. As with the decisions in the
Majority Voting Game, the decision whether to defect from the class by exer-
cising an opt-out option should be driven by rational self-interest. In each
case a party will tend to choose the strategy that makes her better off, unless
some other constraint is placed on her. In a nutshell, the game theoretic con-
cept of core89 describes the conditions under which these kinds of coali-
tions' will or will not tend to be stable. Core theory can thus provide signif-
icant insights into both the causes for instability in a class action setting and
the likelihood for instability given a particular fact pattern or rule structure.
Core is a central concept of cooperative game theory, which examines
situations in which two or more players have at least some ability to commu-
nicate, make binding commitments, and form coalitions.9' Cooperative game
" For a general description of the concept of core, see id. at 397-401; PETER ORDESHOOK, GAME
THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 339-86 (1986); MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES
127-78 (1982) [hereinafter SHUBIK, GAME THEORY]; AKIRA TAKAYAMA, MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 204-
34 (2d ed. 1985). Although game theory in general has assumed an increasingly important place in legal
academics, core theory has only occasionally been used to analyze legal issues. See. e.g., Keith N. Hylton,
Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. L. REV. 471, 502 (1993); Martin Shubik, Game Theory. Law. and the
Concept of Competition, 60 U. CINN. L. REV. 285 (1991); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core The-
or; 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1987).
" In game theory, coalitions are simply groups of players that can agree to coordinate their actions.
See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 302.
' See Wiley, supra note 89, at 557. Cooperative game theory is distinct from noncooperative game
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theory makes two significant assumptions that are important for understand-
ing core. First, game theory assumes that players following particular strate-
gies in a game will receive specified payoffs.'- Second, it assumes that play-
ers will act in their own best interests and that they will choose the coalitions
through which they can obtain the highest possible payoff? The heart of
cooperative game theory concerns the analysis of which coalitions players
should enter into to maximize their payoffs.94
Core is used in cooperative game theory to establish the formal conditions
under which it will be rational for individuals to adopt a group resolution. A
game will have a core if there is some strategy that all players can follow that
will give each a greater payoff than they would receive from forming a dif-
ferent coalition.95 Such games will tend to be stable (i.e., resistant to defec-
tions) because no player will have an incentive to leave the coalition. Any
alternative payoff available to the player will be less than that player would
obtain by staying in the current coalition. Such a solution is said to be within
the core of a game.96 Put another way, a solution to a three-person game,
like the Majority Voting Game, is said to be within the core if it is rational
for each person and each intermediate two-person coalition to stay in the
grand coalition.97 The core of a game is the set of solutions that leaves no
individual in a position to improve its payoff by defecting from the grand
coalition to form a different, intermediate coalition or to strike off on its
own.
98
By contrast, a solution is outside the core of the game if at least one player
can improve its payoff by forming a different coalition, as in the Majority
Voting Game. Solutions that fall outside the core of a game will tend to be
unstable because there will be strong incentives for defections from the
coalition." Indeed, the Majority Voting Game is an example of a game in
theory, in which parties have no such ability to communicate and make binding commitments.
'" See id. at 550.
See id. at 557.
" See DAVID M. KREPS. GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 9 (1990); Wiley. supra note 89.
at 557.
°' See Wiley, supra 89, at 558.
" Id.
A grand coalition consists of all players in the game. See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 395.
See id. at 383; ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340; TAKAYAMA, stpra note 89, at 206; Wiley. .it-
pra note 89, at 558. A player pursuing its own strategy is viewed as forming a coalition of one, known as a
singleton. See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 395.
" See Gardner, supra note 88, at 400-01.
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which all of the solutions fall outside the core. Games of this type are said to
have an empty core because there is no solution which satisfies all play-
ers.'0
Game theory provides a more precise mathematical description of the con-
ditions necessary for existence of a core. These mathematical conditions illu-
minate a number of important points about the application of core theory to
class actions. Let N be the set of finite players in the game (here Players 1, 2,
and 3) and v the characteristic function that assigns values v(S) to each poten-
tial coalition that is a subset of N.'"' Core theory provides that the putative
class members will not opt out of the class action if the payoff associated
with the strategy of remaining in the class action is individually, collectively,
and coalitionally rational.0 2 A payoff x will be individually rational to a
putative class member if
xi > v({i}), for every i r N."03
Individual rationality means that no player can unilaterally defect from the
coalition and guarantee itself a more advantageous outcome."° In other
words, we can expect that players that have the power to veto outcomes that
are not in their individual best interests will do so. In a class action game in
which players have potentially greater recoveries outside of the class action,
defining the rules pursuant to which a player can successfully obtain those
"" See Hylton, supra note 89, at 502: Wiley, supra note 89, at 558. Core theory cannot predict which
of several solutions in the core will be the actual result of the parties' negotiations, nor can it predict what
will happen if the core is empty. See id. at 561. In the former case, the actual result in any particular case
will depend on a variety of considerations, such as the bargaining skills of the parties, relative levels of risk
aversion, or wealth effects. In the latter case, the parties might continue to bargain at great length before
arriving at some resolution or might respond to social, cultural, or institutional restraints that stifle continued
bargaining but are not captured in the game. See id. Inefficiencies of this sort might be limited by restric-
tions on recontracting. See id.
" ' The characteristic function expresses the payoff each player or coalition expects to obtain from
pursuing a particular strategy. See SHUBIK, GAME THEORY, supra note 89, at 128: see also MORTON D.
DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NON-TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 180-81 (rev. ed. 1983). In a class action these
strategies might include defecting from a coalition to pursue an individual action or opposing class certifica-
tion.
.": See H.A. Michner et al., Do Outcomes of N-Person Sidepaymnent Games Fall in the Core?, in CO-
ALITIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 269, 270-71 (Manfred J. Holler ed., 1984).
"' See id. at 270.
'~ See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
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values will have a significant effect on the players' strategy options and on
the potential stability of the class mechanism.
Consider the effect of a rule, like the opt-out rule, that permits any player
to block a solution that encompasses all potential class members. In a situa-
tion in which every player is a potential veto player it may be significantly
more difficult to form a stable class coalition that is resistant to defections.
By contrast, if a majority of players is required to block a global solution,
individual players have no power. Instead, that power shifts to potential inter-
mediate coalitions. Such games may be more stable because a majority of the
players must expect that they will increase their recoveries outside of the
class action.
The second condition for core is that a payoff be collectively rational. This
condition is satisfied if
7 xi > v(N)."
i C.N
This condition amounts to a requirement that the payoff to the parties be
pareto-optimal." In order for any solution to be in the core with respect to
the grand coalition, that coalition must distribute the entire fund to all of the
players.' '7 Suppose that each player in a three-person game can ask for
some portion of a settlement fund M. These strategies (X,, X, and X3) will
all lie between zero and M. No player will rationally ask for less than zero.
The other players will reject any proposal for more than the total sum of M
because that would imply a negative payoff to them. Similarly, the players
will not agree to distribute less than the total of the fund because there will
be some other distribution scheme that makes at least one player better off
without making any other players worse off. As a result, an efficient division
of M must satisfy the condition: X, + X., + X3 = M108
l See Michner et al., supra note 102, at 271.
' See SHUBIK, GAME THEORY, supra note 89, at 141.
'ca See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 341.
"' See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 328. In reality, settlement funds sometimes have excess amounts
that have not been distributed to claimants at the end of a given time period. See Margaret A. Jacobs.
Dalkon IUD Fund Plans Distribution ofLast $1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1995, at B 16 (noting that sur-
plus in Dalkon Shield claimants fund was to be distributed to claimants who had already obtained some
recovery from the claims resolution facility), Dalkon Trust to Pay $800 Million. N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 4. 1995.
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The final condition, coalitional rationality, is an extension of the logic of
individual rationality."° A particular payoff structure is coalitionally rational
if
x.> v(S), for every S c N."'
ie s
What this condition means is that a payoff will lie within the core of a
game if the outcome is rational from every coalition's perspective."' If any
intermediate coalition has the ability to defect from a coalition to obtain a
preferred result, then that payoff is not within the core and the coalition will
tend to be unstable. Taken together, these three conditions demonstrate that
the core of a game in characteristic function form is the set of undominated,
feasible outcomes." 2 Every intermediate coalition and individual must strict-
ly prefer the outcome in a given coalition to any other outcome that it can
achieve."3
Demonstrating whether a core exists in a three-person game is easily ac-
complished using simple set theory to compare the payoffs available to the
players for the two available strategies: stay in the grand coalition or de-
fect."4 Again, a core exists if each player strictly prefers maintaining the
grand coalition of {1, 2, 3} to pursuing individual actions or intermediate
coalitions composed of subsets of the grand coalition. In terms of set theory,
the payoffs available in the grand coalition must satisfy 2"-1 inequalities be-
cause this is the number of alternative coalitions that can be formed from the
set of N players. "' These inequalities correspond to the conditions of indi-
vidual rationality, collective rationality, and coalitional rationality outlined
above. Specifically, for a core to exist, the value of the expected recovery of
at D16 (same); Deadline Is Eased on Agent Orange Claims. N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 1. 1995, at 25 (noting that
surplus of $21 million in Agent Orange compensation fund led court to extend the date by which claims
could be filed against the fund). There are a number of factors that may contribute to such surpluses. First,
it may be difficult to locate all potential claimants. Second, administrators of a claims resolution facility may
undercompensate early claimants due to concerns about potential shortfalls, resulting from either an inability
to identify nonmeritorious claimants or a fear that the amount of the fund was based on unrealistically low
projections about the number of claimants. Finally, rational apathy may prevent small claimants from seek-
ing recovery.
' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
". Michner et al., supra note 102. at 271.
. See ORDESHOOK. supra note 89, at 340.
See id. at 341.
" See id. at 340-41.
". See GARDNER, supra note 88. at 395-401.
" ' See id. at 398; Herbert E. Scarf The Core of an N Person Game, 35 ECONOMETRICA 50, 51 (1967).
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each singleton or intermediate coalition must be less than the value that the
coalition members would receiye if they remained in the grand coalition.
If U, U,,'and U3 represent the payoffs Players 1, 2, and 3 would receive in
the grand coalition, then a core will exist only if the following inequalities
are satisfied:
v({l}) _u,
v({2}) < u,
v({1, 2}) _ u, + u,
v({l, 3}) -< u, + U3
v({2, 3}) < u2 + u3
v({l, 2, 3}) -< u,+ u, + u:.'1
Before turning to a more rigorous application of these core theoretic princi-
ples to class action litigation, it is important to note some basic observations
that derive from these mathematical principles. First, the requirement that 2" -
I inequalities must be satisfied for a core to exist is critical because it empha-
sizes the exponential consequences of complexity and heterogeneity in the
management of class action litigation. The larger n is, the more conditions
will have to be satisfied to find a core. In a three-person bargaining game,
seven inequalities have to be satisfied to find a core. If n is four, however,
the number of inequalities jumps to fifteen. As more and more players are
added, the likelihood of finding a solution that satisfies all of them becomes
significantly smaller. Thus, one way to create a core is to decrease the num-
ber of different constituencies that have to be satisfied.
Second, the ability to create a core will depend heavily on the valud of the
payoffs available outside the class coalition. If one or more players think they
can get a better deal outside of the class action they will opt out, if they are
"' The set theory outlined above provides a simple sufficient condition for core in a 3-person game
with side-payments that highlights the importance of intermediate coalitions:
v({l, 21) + v({Il, 31) + v({2, 31) < 2M.
See GARDNER. supra note 88. at 401. This condition is arrived at by taking the sum of the inequalities for
the three possible intermediate coalitions:
v({l, 21) + %({I, 3J) + v(12. 31) 5 2(u. + u, + u,).
If a fixed amount is available to all of the players whether they opt out of the class action or not. then M
can be substituted for the sum of the utilities. See id.; see also SHUBIK, GAME THEORY, supra note 89, at
147. This condition basically provides that if the two-person coalitions do not have outside options that are
too large, then there is some solution within the core. See GARDNER. supra note 88, at 401: SHUBIK, GAME
THEORY, supra note 89, at 147.
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given the ability to do so. The number of players who may potentially defect
may be increased if one player with a higher outside option can transfer some
portion of its payoff (utility) to another player."7 The Majority Voting
Game is an example of such a game because the players could transfer among
themselves portions of the political power they would jointly hold in a ruling
coalition.' In game theoretic parlance, these transfer payments are known
as sidepayments." 9 Games with sidepayments are important because they
will tend to have solutions that fall outside of the core.' 21 In other words,
these games will tend to be less stable than games without sidepayments.
Sidepayments become crucially important in modeling class action litigation
because they provide a ready means for demonstrating some of the important
dynamics of class action bargaining that may occur when opt-out rights are
permitted.'2 ' To create a core, it may be necessary to restrict sidepayments.
Third, whether and to what extent a core will exist in a class action de-
pends crucially on the rules that determine whether putative class members
have the ability to defect from the coalition to attempt to obtain alternative
payoffs. Simply put, games will tend to lack stability when players have the
ability to pursue better options, which will be a function of the rules of the
game.22 If class members have an unlimited ability to defect from a class
coalition, then it will become significantly harder to find a solution within the
core. If defections are limited in some fashion, then a core solution may be
more likely. If a class action has an empty core, then no global resolution of
the class action is possible because class members will have both the ability
and the incentive to defect from the class coalition.
IV. APPLYING CORE THEORY TO CLASS ACTIONS
The principles drawn from core theory provide an exceedingly useful tool
for formally analyzing the causes of instability in class actions. To see how
core can be used in this fashion, this Part creates a simple three-person bar-
gaining model of a class action. The model is first used to demonstrate how
core theory confirms the traditional rationale for employing mandatory class
' See Michner et al., supra note 102, at 270.
"s See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
"' See Michner et al., supra note 102, at 270.
See id.
See infra Part IV.C.
See Wiley, supra note 89, at 561.
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actions in limited fund cases. More importantly, this discussion preliminarily
demonstrates that it is possible to view the entire evolving structure of mass
tort class action litigation and settlement as an exercise in imposing con-
straints sufficient to force the inequalities necessary for finding a core to be
satisfied. Various strategies courts have experimented with can all be ex-
plained as attempts to decrease sufficiently the value of outside options so as
to create a core and thereby to facilitate a global class resolution.
This Part also tests various justifications offered for opt-out rights. Applica-
tion of the model raises significant concerns about the "market check" ratio-
nale for permitting opt-outs.' 2 3 Core theoretic principles demonstrate that
opt-outs act as a poor filter in this regard because under certain conditions
parties may not opt out even if a proposed class action settlement is inade-
quate, and may opt out even when faced with an adequate settlement. Finally,
the core theoretic model is used to demonstrate how opt-out rights can be-
come powerful bargaining tools and can shift power dramatically within the
class action.
A. A Basic Class Action Model
This Article uses a simple class action model that is quite similar to the
Majority Voting Game 4 to formalize some of the intuitions concerning the
effects and benefits of granting or denying opt-out rights. Like all game theo-
retic models, the model employed here greatly simplifies the dynamics of
class action litigation. The court has before it a request to certify a class ac-
tion. The court has determined that class certification is appropriate and now
must decide whether to certify a mandatory class action pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B) or an opt-out class action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The class consists of three mem-
bers, or Players, 1, 2, and 3. Defendant has agreed to settle the class action, if
' See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
':' See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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certified, for a sum of money M equal to $600.25 This sum equals the total
amount of the defendant's assets.
In deciding the certification issue, the court will take into account the likely
strategic responses of the parties should it certify an opt-out class action. In
such an action, the parties have two potential strategies, remain in the class or
opt out.126 The model assumes that the players who will be making the stra-
tegic decision about whether to opt out of the class are profit-maximizing,
entrepreneurial plaintiff's attorneys. 27 In this simplified model, each attor-
ney is paid on a contingency basis and maximizes its fee award by maximiz-
ing the recovery to its client. 12' Each player's only interest when choosing
between alternative strategies is to maximize utility,'29 which in this model
is measured exclusively in terms of increasing the total amount of the client's
" When multiple decisionmakers are present, there may be strong conflicts concerning the settlement
structure, the procedural protections that will be applicable to particular groups of claimants. the procedures
for determining individual allocations, and the like. See McGovern, supra note 64, at 680-82. For example,
in the Third Circuit's recent decision in Georgine v. Anichein Products. Inc. to decertify an asbestos class
action, the court pointed to significant conflicts that are likely to arise between present and future claimants
with respect to the terms of any settlement. 83 F.3d 610, 630-31 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nora. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996). Present claimants may seek to maximize current payouts
under any settlement, may care little for inflation protections, and may want to limit future opt-outs to the
extent that such limitations increase the chance that defendants will agree to the settlement. Id. at 631. By
contrast, future claimants may want to reduce current payouts so that the fund is preserved, may seek to put
in place inflation protections, and might desire a delayed opt-out right that would allow them to pursue a
tort remedy if the settlement award proved to be less than they could obtain in a tort action. Id. at 630.
These conflicts counseled against class certification "[a]bsent structural protections to assure that differently
situated plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique interests.... " Id. at 631. Although some of these structur-
al issues are beyond the scope of this Article, others can quite easily be explained using core theoretic prin-
ciples. As noted previously, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Georgine to consider the require-
ments for certification of a settlement class action. See supra note 2.
" In the real world, opposing class certification is another strategy option. The choice between these
two strategies is likely to depend on a player's assessment of the relative likelihood that a given strategy
will permit defection from collective treatment. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 4. at 135 (noting that it is some-
times easy for parties in mass tort cases to defeat class certification).
'2' This assumption comports with the majority of class action practice. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial
Litigation. supra note 4. at 882-89, 890-904: Macey & Miller, mtpra note 64, at 7-8.
'2' The law and economics critique of class actions has forcefully demonstrated that a plaintiff's attor-
ney's incentives may not be so well aligned with those of its clients. Particular fee structures may create
significant misincentives and agency costs in class action litigation. See. e.g.. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litiga-
tion, supra note 4, at 887-89; Coffee, Understanding the Plaintifs Attorne, supra note 64, at 669-70;
Grundfest & Perino, supra note 29, at 565-67; Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 22-23. Although these
agency costs are real and may exacerbate some of the problems modeled here, the core theoretic model dem-
onstrates that the existence of the problems observed in class action litigation does not depend on the pres-
ence of agency costs. See infra Part V.A.
"2' See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 22 (1989).
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individual recovery. Players are assumed to have no ideological interests that
will affect their valuation of particular alternatives. 3
This core theoretic model, while admittedly simplified and reductionist, is
sufficient to generate many, if not all, of the phenomena observed in class
litigation. The model demonstrates that a core will exist in an opt-out class
action only if the putative class members can find an allocation of M that will
make each party better off by remaining in the class action than by exercising
its option to opt out of the class action. If some other coalition or individual
can increase its recovery by opting out of the class action, then it can block
any solution to the game that encompasses all the players."' To be sure, the
model is unlikely to duplicate precisel, the kinds of interactions that exist in
the real world. 32 The model does, however, provide a formal framework
for evaluating the tensions underlying the grant of opt-out rights in class
actions.'
Using only three players,'34 the model captures much of the complexity
of class actions and demonstrates many of the factors that contribute to unsta-
ble class coalitions. A three-person model permits an analysis of the condi-
tions under which intermediate coalitions may form and an assessment of the
significant impact that such coalitions may have on the manner in which a
' These assumptions are likely to reflect to a significant degree much of class action litigation, but
they are by no means absolutes. For example, it is possible that some parties might define an optimal strate-
gy as one that maximizes something other than monetary return to the individual plaintiff. A plaintiff may
be more interested in a public apology from the defendant or wide publicity concerning the defendant's
alleged misdeeds, goals which may be inconsistent in the particular case with maximizing monetary recov-
ery. Nonetheless, maximizing monetary recovery is most likely a dominant real-world strategy for the major-
ity of players in the class action game.
.' See Scarf, supra note 115, at 50.
u. In class actions there may be many reasons why negotiations might not follow this pattern. Certain-
ly. in a world of incomplete and imperfect information, the players may not be able to assess accurately the
exact value of their exit options. To the extent that the model assumes that players respond to credible
threats and ignore incredible ones, it cannot predict the outcome of every case, but rather suggests what the
outcome over a significant range of similar cases should be. See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A
Simple Noncooperative Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 3-1 I. 332-33 (1991).
'. See BAIRD ETr AL, supra note 28, at 221.
" The model assumes that the attorneys are the actors who make the strategic decisions. In this re-
gard, the three players can thus be thought of as subclasses of claimants within the class action. The players
can be seen as amalgamations of individual claimants represented by the same profit-maximizing, entrepre-
neurial attorney that manages its portfolio of claimants to achieve the best possible recovery. See Coffee.
Class Warv, supra note 4. at 1365; Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation. supra note 4, at 879. This kind of
management may include pursuing a single overall strategy for the group. See Coffee, Class Wi:. supra
note 4, at 1365. In game theory, multiple players who pursue the same strategy can be treated as one player.
See SHUBIK, GAME THEORY, supra note 89, at 18.
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class action is resolved. It also provides valuable insights into the kind of
give-and-take bargaining that is likely to occur among class plaintiffs. The
model can easily be extended to n players, thereby making it much more
complex. As has been shown previously, however, adding more parties to the
game would simply cause the conditions necessary for finding a core to grow
exponentially.'35 The three-person model is more than sufficient to demon-
strate just how difficult it may be to find a core in a class action.'36
The model's constant sum assumption permits it to isolate the strategic
choices presented to class members concerning whether to pursue aggregative
processes and the negotiation between different members of the class as to the
portion of the settlement that each will receive. To do that, it is first neces-
sary to hold constant another dynamic process that is likely to be ongoing at
the same time-the negotiations between the plaintiffs and the defendant over
the size of the proposed settlement. This latter process certainly has a pro-
found effect on class action dynamics, and the model does not seek to suggest
otherwise.'37 Instead, it focuses on the effect that strategic interactions
among putative class members are likely to have on the ability to achieve
global class action settlements. Application of core theoretic principles to
these strategic interactions allows this Article to highlight many of the impor-
tant forces that underlie the difficulties exhibited in many mass tort class
actions.
B. Limited Funds and Mandatory Classes: How to Make a Core
The mandatory class action is seen as the most extreme example of collec-
tivized mass tort procedures. As such, it provides an excellent starting point
for applying core theory to the analysis of class actions because the results of
core theory can be compared to the traditional rationales for certifying man-
datory class actions. Moreover, mandatory classes are emblematic of other
collectivized procedures that are used in mass tort litigation to decrease the
likelihood that significant opt-outs will destroy the efficacy of global settle-
ment. By analyzing how a core is created in mandatory classes, we can begin
"' See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
" See SHUBIK, GAME THEORY, supra note 89, at 20 (comparing the "parallel" two-person game to the
more complicated three-person game).
1.7 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 28, at 195 (noting that "[s]orting out the relationships between the
litigation game and the other aspects of the interactions between the parties is especially difficult in cases
such as class actions, in which there may be multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants").
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to see that all of these techniques (including imposing costs on opt-outs and
settlement class actions) are merely variations on the same theme. All are
attempts to find a solution that satisfies the 2' - 1 inequalities that must be
satisfied in order to find a core and achieve a global class action resolution.
We can initially test the explanatory power of core theory by seeing wheth-
er it confirms the traditional justifications for denying opt-out rights in limit-
ed fund cases certified under Rule 23(b)(1), i.e., that mandatory classing
helps to alleviate the collective action problem that arises when too many
claimants are chasing after too few assets.' In fact, core theory jibes well
with the theoretical underpinnings of the limited fund doctrine because it
demonstrates that in cases involving a fund that is insufficient to compensate
all claimants, opt-out rights provide claimants competing for a common pool
with a method for imposing significant externalities on other claimants.
To see this, we employ the basic class model in which the defendant has a
total of $600 in assets, all of which will be used to satisfy claims against it. If
each player remained in the class, it would obtain a recovery (Ui). The play-
ers expect that their recoveries in the class action will be: U, = $300; U, =
$60; U3 = $240. 3' Each player expects that if it could opt out of the class
action, then it would be able to obtain a complete recovery for all of its inju-
ries. In this case, the payoff from opting out is 25% higher than the payoff
from remaining in the class action, such that: v({ I }) = $375; v({2}) = $75;
v({3}) = $300.t4 4 This scenario represents a classic limited fund case be-
"' See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820 (1985); FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(l)(B) advi-
sory committee's note. see also supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
"' The actual division among the class members will depend on a number of variables, including the
strength of their claims, the extent of alleged injuries, the substantive rules of tort recovery, the players'
bargaining skill and aversion to risk, and any legally relevant factors. In any given case. a court may ap-
prove a range of different distribution proposals because it would not likely have or be willing to impose its
own rigid view of the optimal distribution, particularly when it has incomplete information concerning all of
the factors upon which an assessment of the optimal distribution can be made. For purposes of demonstrat-
ing some of the potentially destabilizing forces at work in class actions, arriving at an exact calculation of
the manner in which class members will choose to allocate a fund is unnecessary. It is sufficient to assume
for analytical purposes that the parties would agree and the court would approve some division of the $600,
such as the one suggested in the text.
"" In practice, determining payoffs for the two strategies of remain in the class action or opt-out can
become complicated. Assessment of the expected payoffs will turn on factors similar to those a plaintiff
would consider in determining whether to settle a case. See Stephen M. Bundy. Cornmentary on "Under-
standing Pennzoil v. Texaco : Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems. 75 VA. L. REV. 335. 337 (1989);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Adininistration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfoir Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984). As with settlements, a class attorney will choose the alternative that provides
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cause the assets available to compensate claimants do not fully compensate
the players.3 4'
Absent the mandatory class, core theory predicts that these kinds of cases
will be unstable because none of the inequalities necessary for finding a core
is satisfied. The value that each player expects from opting out is greater than
the recovery each would obtain in the grand coalition. 4"2 As a result, the
condition of individual rationality dictates that each singleton will strictly
prefer opting out of the class action to remaining a member of the class.'43
The payoff that each intermediate coalition expects from choosing the defec-
tion strategy is similarly greater than the payoff from maintaining the grand
coalition. The value of these intermediate coalitions is: v({1, 2}) = 450; v({1,
3}) = 675; v({2, 3}) = 375. Given the previously defined sufficient condition
for finding a core, v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({2, 3}) < 2M, ' we can see
that the intermediate coalitions' claims are simply too large for a core to
exist:
450 + 675 + 375 < 1200
1500 < 1200.
her with the most value. See Priest, supra, at 4. If the opt-out question arises in conjunction with a proposed
settlement, as often is the case in class action litigation, the class attorney will determine the amount she
expects to recover from the class, which may be subject to a contingency fee arrangement or may have to be
approved by the court. The attorney will compare this amount to the expected judgment in an independent
lawsuit, which will be the product of the probability of a favorable verdict and an estimate of the present
value of that judgment. See Bundy, supra. at 337 n.5. To determine the expected gain from opting out, the
attorney will subtract the expected litigation costs of pursuing the individual action from the expected judg-
ment and add the expected costs of securing the class settlement that will be avoided. See id. In a world of-
incomplete and imperfect knowledge, none of these calculations is likely to be amenable to precise determi-
nation. See id.; Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, I I J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 232-33 (1982).
Another way to view these calculations is under an options pricing model. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
A New Theory Concerning the Credibilitj and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1996); Brad-
ford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990). This theo-
ry, which has been used to explain the incentives to sue and the circumstances under which threats to sue
are credible, can be extended to the decision to opt out of a class action.
"' See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also ht re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
B.R. 710, 806 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated an othergrounds. 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), niodified. 993
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
142 See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 395-401. The unsatisfied inequalities are as follows: v( I,) = 375
5 300; vJ121) = 75 < 60: '({31) = 3005 <240.
"' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
'44 See GARDNER, supra note 88. at 401. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY, supra note 89, at 147.
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Simply put, no intermediate coalition would prefer to remain in the class
action and receive the available payoff when the payoff from defecting from
the class is greater. 45
As this is a constant sum game, it is readily apparent that all the players
cannot simultaneously obtain the full amount of the expected payoffs to each
singleton. There is only so much money to go around, and there are no
strategies the parties can undertake to increase the size of the pot. In a case
with a constant sum the last inequality necessary for finding a core, v({ 1, 2,
3}) < U, + U2 + U3, is actually an equality, v({1, 2, 3}) = U, + U2 + U3, that
must be satisfied. 46 This means that if all the players opt out of the class
action, then the most that they can obtain in the aggregate is $600.' 41 Of
course, this condition says nothing about what each player's share of the
$600 will be. A common pool problem arises because the presence of higher
outside options creates an overlapping distribution of rights when acquisition
(here, through obtaining and executing on a judgment before the pool is de-
pleted) creates an absolute priority of ownership. 4' Assuming that each
player has a similar ability to defect, the likely result is that each player will
seek to obtain the earliest judgment so that it can recover the full amount of
its claim. In other words, there will be a classic race to judgment with each
claimant seeking to assert dominion over its full share in the common pool of
assets. This is precisely the situation that mandatory class actions were de-
signed to avoid. 4
9
The mandatory class action works in much the same way as bankruptcy to
solve this collective action problem. 5 In core theoretic terms, both proce-
dures alleviate the problem because they eliminate the opportunity to engage
in individual litigation. In so doing, both procedures also eliminate any value
that can be derived from defecting from the grand coalition.' A core exists
' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340 (noting that for solution to be within core it must be ratio-
nal from the perspective of every possible coalition).
' See GARDNER, szpra note 88, at 401. In the model, the defendant has paid a maximum amount of
$600. By definition, there is no strategy the players can follow that will enable them to obtain more than the
$600.
147 See id.
'4' See Picker, supra note 30, at 647.
See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Bendectin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1984); Cutler v. 65 Sec. Plan, 831 F. Supp. 1008. 1020-
21 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(I)(B) advisory committee's note.
" See Baird & Picker. supra note 132. at 315.
" See Wiley. supra note 89, at 561; see also Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation. sapra note 4, at 908
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because the payoff to players in each singleton and intermediate coalition is
zero, which is less than the payoff available through the grand coalition. 15 2
A player could defect from the grand coalition simply by refusing to partici-
pate in the mandatory class action, but such an action would be irrational
because the player would obtain a payoff of zero. As a result, mandatory
classing creates a kind of enforced stability in which coalitional rationality is
created by making the coalition the only available strategy for obtaining a
payoff.
The class action model and the principles of core theory it illustrates thus
support the traditional application of mandatory classing to situations where a
defendant's assets are clearly insufficient to satisfy the claims against it.
Similarly, core theory demonstrates that mandatory classing may have a
broader utility because the same ability to impose externalities on other
claimants exists in any class action involving a constant sum where players
have potentially more valuable outside options. Put another way, core theory
provides formal support for the observations a number of courts and com-
mentators have made that a compromise collective procedure through which
claimants are given the right to pursue individualized litigation may not be
viable."'
Constant sum cases raise the specter of significant collective action prob-
lems that may create unstable coalitions, regardless of whether that sum is
sufficient to compensate fully all competing claimants. To see this, consider
the following revised example in which there is again a sum certain of $600
to be divided among Players 1, 2, and 3. This time, there is no dispute that
the sum is sufficient to compensate all three class members for the full extent
of their alleged injuries. There are no other injured parties that would be
entitled to compensation from the defendant. The players expect that their
n.73 ("The standard solution to a 'common pool' problem in the oil and gas industry has been compulsory
unitization, and the mandatory class action is a functional analogue to this strategy.").
". A mandatory class action creates the following inequalities:
v(1 11) =0 <u,
1 = 0 -< u.,
vJ{3D1 ) 0 -< u,
v, 1,) = 0 < u, + u,
v(I, 31) = 0 - u. + u,
t112, 31) 0 u, + u,
See GARDNER, suprt note 88, at 395-401.
"' See Rabin. supra note I, at 1042.
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recoveries in the class action will be: U, = $300; U, = $60; U3 = $240. Player
3 expects to be able to recover $300 if it is able to pursue an individual ac-
tion.54 Players 1 and 2 expect no greater recovery from individual actions.
Although the problem is somewhat artificial, there is at least a strong possi-
bility that under the prevailing legal precedents the court may not certify a
mandatory class action.'55 The ability to certify a mandatory class may be
difficult given both the strict standards some courts have established for find-
ing the existence of a limited fund and the evidentiary difficulties likely to be
encountered in a pretrial setting.'56 Mass tort cases present even greater dif-
ficulties because of the strong presumption in favor of maintaining litigative
autonomy in cases involving personal injury.'57 In any event, no limited
fund would seem to exist in the hypothetical case because the defendant's as-
sets are by definition sufficient to compensate fully all claimants for their
injuries. Likewise, under the abbreviated facts presented, there appears to be
no punitive damages overkill theory or a limited fund of insurance proceeds
that could support certifying a mandatory class.'58 For these reasons, if the
court certifies a class action at all, then it is likely to do so only under Rule
23(b)(3).' 59
"4 See infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the kinds of factors, other than
those related to the merits, that may cause an individualized jury award to be greater than a class action set-
tlement recovery.
"' Given the tenor of recent appellate cases, class certification might be deemed inappropriate. See
supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
"" See. e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig.. 789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir. 1986); lI re Bendectin Prods.
Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300. 306 (6th Cir. 1984); Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1982);
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269, 276 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (finding no substantial probability of the
existence of a limited fund because the estimated settlement value of the class was less than available insur-
ance coverage), aff'd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Cobum v. 4-R Corp.. 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977),
mandanns deniedsub nora. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th
Cir. 1978); hut see Cuitle; 831 F. Supp. at 1020 (noting that mandatory classing "is particularly appropriate
where class members have claims against a fund whose assets may prove insufficient to satisfy all of them"):
In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandanus denied sub
no,. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), and afJ'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987); McGovern, supra note 64, at 667.
"4 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
", See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Jenkins. 109 F.R.D. at 276; i re "Agent
Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 724. If class members reside in different states and there appear to be no minimum
contacts with the forum state, a court attempting to certify a mandatory class would also face the thorny
jurisdictional problem raised in Phillips Petroleun Co. v. Shuts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). See supra note 24.
"' See. e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); /n re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161
F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995).
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The fact that the class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3) gives at least some
class members the ability to* pursue outside options that may have higher
payoffs."W In this game, there is again no core for the three-person coalition
{1, 2, 3} because the inequality v({3}) < $240 is not satisfied. The payoff
Player 3 receives from defecting to form a single person coalition is greater
than the payoff Player 3 receives from remaining in the grand coalition. Un-
der these conditions, it will be rational for Player 3 to opt out of the grand
coalition if it cannot be induced to stay. 6'
Player 3's action is likely to have a further destabilizing effect in this game
because it is a constant sum game. If Player 3 obtains a $300 payoff, then
only $300 remains to be split between Players 1 and 2 even though they
would have received a payoff in the grand coalition of $360. Player 3's opt-
out may change the payoff structure for Players 1 and 2, thereby causing
them to re-evaluate the rationality of remaining in an intermediate coalition.
Under these revised circumstances, Players I and 2 may also choose to defect
from the coalition to pursue individual actions, if through such actions they
expect to obtain the full amount of their claims or a greater amount than they
expect to recover through class procedures. This cascading effect is akin to a
bank run when the fact that some depositors have begun to withdraw their
funds leads others to do the same.'
62
Again, even though the recoveries in the class action may have sufficiently
compensated the claimants, the same kind of race to judgment that mandatory
classing seeks to prevent can potentially exist. Essentially, the presence of a
single opportunity to obtain a higher recovery in an opt-out class action with
a constant sum may create a situation in which a class action becomes as
unstable as the class in which the fund is inadequate to satisfy all claimants.
The common pool problem remains because even with only one higher out-
side option, there is still an "overlapping distribution of rights."'63 In this
kind of case, mandatory classing solves the tragedy of the commons problem
by prohibiting claimants from exploiting assets to the greatest extent possible.
Without mandatory classing, it is not individually rational for class members
" See Wiley, supra note 89, at 561.
'~' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340. See infra Part IV.D. for a discussion of the circumstances
under which other players might induce a player with valuable outside options to stay in the grand coalition.
"2 See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN. THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 320-
27 (1989); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 401, 401 (1983).
1. Picker, supra note 30, at, 647.
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to stay in the coalition. With opt-out rights, the coalition containing all three
players has no core because each member of the class strictly prefers the
outcome of opting out over the outcome of remaining in the class."'
This constant sum analysis applies to any common pool of assets and is not
limited to situations in which claims are likely to equal or exceed defendant's
assets. Indeed, consider a situation, like the breast implant litigation,'
5
where a class action has been provisionally certified and there is a proposed
global settlement. These settlements are, of course, usually less than the sum
total of defendant's assets. In such a case, defendant's assets are not a con-
stant sum that is less than or equal to the claims asserted; so a mandatory
class action is unlikely to be certified unless the court is willing to certify a
pool of insurance coverage as a limited fund, something only a few courts
have been willing to do.'" The fact that other assets may be available
against which singletons or intermediate coalitions can proceed in an attempt
to realize higher payoffs means that the players might have a good chance to
obtain the higher recovery outside the grand coalition. Assuming transaction
and agency costs are not a problem, in such a case a core may not exist for
the grand coalition because the conditions of individual and coalitional ra-
tionality may not be satisfied.'67 All of the players with higher outside op-
tions will strictly prefer the higher recovery outside the class action, all will
have a means to obtain that recovery, and all should rationally defect.
Global settlements may be viewed as constant sums. Core theory thus sup-
ports the intuition that preserving opt-out rights may reduce the prospects for
negotiated class action settlements because it may be difficult for defendants
to obtain global peace.' Of course, it might be suggested that the availabil-
ity of higher payoffs through intermediate coalitions or singletons may indi-
cate an inadequate or collusive settlement. In such circumstances, it has been
suggested that the ability to opt out may act as an important procedural safe-
' See ORDESHOOK, suipra note 89. at 340-41.
'' This litigation is discussed below in Part V.B. See infr'a notes 236-38, 266-87 and accompanying
text.
's See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996); A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 717-18,
"' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340; Michner et al., supra note 102, at 270-71.
' See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-100000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12521, at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. I, 1994): WEINSTEIN, supra note 4. at 26, 136 & n.108; Coffee,
Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1382-83; see also Rabin, supra note I, at 1042 ("[lIt remains an open question
whether and to what extent an exit mechanism-the opt-out-can be incorporated into the hybrid approach
in a fashion that satisfies individual justice concerns yet avoids undermining the collective justice remedial
system.").
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guard."9 Indeed, this safeguard is considered essential because the alterna-
tive protection afforded class members, rigorous judicial oversight of class
action settlements, is seen as largely ineffective.'70
There are a number of responses that can be made to this rationale for
maintaining opt-out rights. First, appellate courts have recently demonstrated
a renewed vigor in monitoring class action settlements.' 7 ' Second, and more
importantly from the perspective of core theory, opt-outs may not act as an
effective market check for proposed settlements. As is demonstrated below,
although higher payoffs outside the grand coalition may in certain cases be
consistent with an inadequate settlement, core theory demonstrates that the
invocation of opt-out rights does not necessarily correlate with inadequacy of
recovery.
C. The Opt-Out as a Market Check Against Inadequacy
Opt-out rights can act as an effective market check against inadequate or
collusive settlements.'72 In order for the opt-out right to perform this func-
tion, there needs to be a significant correlation between high numbers of opt-
outs and inadequate settlements. Conversely, there should also be relatively
few opt-outs in cases where the settlement is fair. Core theory suggests that
these conditions do not hold with respect to many kinds of class action settle-
ments. In many circumstances opt-outs will perform this market-checking
function rather poorly, if at all. In some cases, inadequate settlements may
not prompt class members to opt out. In other cases, class members may opt
out even in the face of an adequate settlement. Thus, the strongest claim that
can be made for opt-out rights in this regard is that they can, but need not,
act as a market check on the fairness of a settlement.
" See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
"' See Alexander, supra note 64, at 566; Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 64, at 26-27; Macey
& Miller, supra note 64, at 45-47.
" See, e g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nora. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996): In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
" See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
1997]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Under certain conditions, inadequacy' may not prompt the affected party
to opt out because the crucial factors in determining if a stable coalition ex-
ists are whether players have the potential for obtaining a higher payoff from
defecting and whether the rules permit class members to obtain that
recovery."7 The presence of potentially valuable outside options is not nec-
essarily a product of an inadequate payoff through a coalition, if we use "in-
adequate" to mean that the payoff does not fully compensate the player based
upon some objective, agreed-upon criteria. To be sure, the payoff inside the
grand coalition may be inadequate, and the presence of such an inadequate
payoff may prompt a player to opt out. But it will not be rational for a player
to defect from a coalition even in the face of an inadequate payoff if the
amount of any payoff the player would receive from forming a singleton or
intermediate coalition would be less than the inadequate payoff in the grand
coalition. 75
Take for example Player I in the class action model.' 6 Assume Player I
expects a payoff of $100 from forming a singleton And opting out of the class
action. Player 1 also expects a recovery of $125 from maintaining the grand
coalition. The differences in the recoveries reflect the higher costs to Player I
from pursuing an individual action. In such a case, the inequality v({ 100}) <
125 is satisfied.' If the strategies available to Player 1 are opting out or
remaining in the class coalition, then the condition of individual rationality
dictates that Player 1 will remain in the class action.' Whether the $125 is
adequate simply does not enter into the analysis. If the payoff to each single-
ton and intermediate coalition follows a similar pattern, then there will be a
core for the class action consisting of all players. The conditions of individual
"' The term "adequate" raises the question: "Adequate judged by what standards?" In mass tort class
actions, significant issues may arise with respect to how different fora's substantive polices might lead to
substantially different views concerning the measure of adequate compensatory or punitive damages. These
differences can of course raise significant choice of law concerns in nationwide class actions alleging state
law claims. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); hi re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1294-1301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). These issues are beyond the scope of
this Article, which seeks instead to construct a simple formal model that highlights some of the potential
factors, other than collusion or inadequate compensation, that can lead to class instability. In keeping with
this goal, this Article will use "adequate compensation" to mean a recovery that is sufficient to make a
plaintiff whole for all of its legally cognizable injuries under the appropriate legal standards.
" See Wiley, supra note 89, at 561.
' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
"' See supra Part V.A.
'77 See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 395-401.
"' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
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rationality and coalitional rationality will be satisfied regardless of how the
payoff in the grand coalition compares to some objective measurement of
adequacy.'
To be sure, a player might pursue strategies inside the class action to in-
crease the potential recovery if such actions are cost-effective in comparison
to the expected increased recovery. ' But, at least in this case, opting out
does not appear to be a viable strategy option, and we can expect that class
actions of this sort will tend to be stable. An example of such a situation may
be a classic "large-stakes, small-claims" class action, such as a consumer class
action, where the transaction or opportunity costs associated with pursuing an
individual action are greater than in the class action. Indeed, in the paradigm
large-stakes, small-claims class action, the payoff to a singleton or intermedi-
ate coalition may effectively be zero because the fixed costs of litigation
exceed the expected payoff, meaning that it will be irrational for any attorney
to bring an individual case. 8'
By the same reasoning, core theory is consistent with the insight that opt-
outs can also serve as a means for internal class conflict that may give coali-
tion members strategies for realizing larger shares of the fixed assets available
to compensate the class. In this situation, opt-outs may destroy the viability
of a class action even if a recovery within the grand coalition appears to be
adequite because of the prospect of large compensatory or punitive damages
from sympathetic juries.'11 An adequate payoff through a grand coalition
does not guarantee that a player will remain in the coalition. Indeed, if the
value of the payoff through a singleton or intermediate coalition is greater
than the payoff available through the grand coalition, the only rational thing
for the player to do is to defect.'83 An objective observer might conclude
that the proposed class recovery is more than sufficient under the relevant
legal precedents, but such a conclusion will matter little to a player seeking to
maximize the amount of its payoff. Core theoretic notions of individual and
" See id. For definitions of the conditions of individual and coalitional rationality see supra notes
101-13.
See Grundfest & Perino. supra note 29, at 563-77.
" See infra Part IV.D. for a core theoretic analysis of such a situation. See hif'a Part V.B. for a real
world analogue of such a situation.
' See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
" Again, the conditions of individual and collective rationality dictate that the players. as rational
utility maximizers, will defect from the grand coalition. See ORDESHOOK. supra note 89. at 340; Michner et
al., supra note 102, at 270-71.
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coalitional rationality have little to do with the adequacy or inadequacy of a
class recovery. Rather, the driving forces underlying unstable class actions are
the presence of an inequality between the payoffs available through the grand
coalition and payoffs available through smaller coalitions, and a strategy open
to the players to obtain those alternative payoffs.
Whether under these conditions opt-out rights can function as an effective
market check is subject to legitimate questioning. Again, this is not to say
that inadequate or even collusive settlements as a byproduct of significant
agency costs are not a problem in class action litigation. That proposition has
been well established." 4 But the relative number of opt-outs in any given
case may not be a reliable indicator that such an inadequate settlement has
been proposed.
The presence of a mixed claimant population may also decrease the ability
of opt-out rights to act as an effective indicator of adequacy. If some plain-
tiffs have sufficiently large stakes in the class action, then they may seek to
opt out in the face of a settlement that gives them less than they could re-
cover in an individual tort suit. But this does not necessarily constitute strong
evidence that the settlement as a whole is unfair; it says nothing about wheth-
er the settlement is a fair allocation among all claimants, including small or
future claimants who may have no practical ability to opt out." 5 Core theo-
ry suggests that to the extent the invocation of an opt-out right acts as a mar-
ket test, it only tests whether the proposed settlement amount allocated to
large claimants is equivalent to the baseline tort awards those claimants rea-
sonably expect in individual actions. Significant opt-outs may simply be a
manifestation of the common pool problem that may cause individual class
members, driven by rational self-interest, to seek a disproportionately large
portion of any potential recovery through pursuing individualized adjudica-
tion. In these cases, using opt-out rights as a check is at best an imperfect
means of identifying or deterring inadequate settlements and collusion be-
cause it is overbroad and imprecise. Invocation of these rights may not suffi-
ciently distinguish inadequate settlement cases from those cases where valu-
able outside options exist. Providing a system that permits each claimant to
choose "the particular mix of collective and individual claiming that best
'u See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
' See Cramton, supra note 12, at 824.
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serves her wishes"'8 6 may simply maintain a system that permits collective
action problems to flourish.
D. Bargaining in the Shadow of Opt-Out Rights
The credible threat to opt out of a class action can act as a powerful bar-
gaining tool. This observation is particularly true with respect to high-stakes
claimants who may have sufficient power to destroy the viability of a global
class resolution. To be sure, this ability to credibly exit from the collective
should give the claimants significant power in any negotiations with defen-
dants. But for purposes of this Article it is more important to note that the
ability to opt out can give these claimants significant bargaining leverage over
other class members who do not have credible opt-out options. These condi-
tions may prevail in a typical mass tort case because of the often disparate
claimants that are cobbled together in a single class.
If a fixed sum is available from the defendant, then it is rational for a play-
er with a higher outside option to opt out of a class action unless other play-
ers can induce it to stay. This observation is consistent with the notion that
one purpose of aggregative litigation procedures is to provide competing
claimants with a forum in which they can bargain for allocations of any re-
covery from the defendants. In this regard, class actions can act in a similar
way to bankruptcy which, instead of being merely a vehicle to overcome
collective action problems, may sometimes serve to frame negotiations be-
tween the firm's senior creditor and its management.'87 Indeed, bargaining
over the allocation of M in the class action calls to mind a broader array of
bargaining situations that are shaped by legal rules providing alternatives to
the negotiators. 88 These legal rules are in essence "exit options" because
they give one or more players the ability to cut short negotiations and receive
some alternative payoff."9
See Schuck. supra note 4. at 964.
"' See Baird & Picker, supra note 132, at 311. Of course, this is exactly the situation in some mass
tort cases in which the relevant defendants have filed for bankruptcy. For a description of the Dalkon Shield
case, which demonstrates how the bankruptcy framed negotiations between the defendant and the plaintiffs,
see McGovem. supra note 64, at 675-88. This Article argues that not only can the collectivized procedure
frame negotiations between the defendants and the plaintiffs, it can also frame negotiations among the plain-
tiffs if some but not all plaintiffs have a credible exit option.
"' See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 28, at 224; see also GARDNER, supra note 88. at 327-56, 382-409;
RASMUSEN, supra note 129, at 227-44.
"' BAIRD ET AL.. supra note 28, at 221, see also Baird & Picker. supra note 132. at 319; John Sutton,
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Whether and to what extent a party will exercise that exit option will de-
pend on the strength of the option. The strength of the exit option will also
determine whether the player possessing the option will derive any negotiat-
ing benefit from it. If the exit option is weak because the alternative payoff is
less than the amount the player could otherwise obtain through bargaining,
then the exit option will not affect the player's bargaining.'" Any threat to
resort to the exit option will not be credible. A player with a strong exit op-
tion will have a payoff alternative that is greater than the amount the player
might otherwise be able to bargain for in the negotiations. In this case, the
exit option will place a floor on the payoff the player must receive in a bar-
gained-for agreement. 9' If it were offered any lesser amount, the player
would simply exercise the exit option.
The concept of exit options can be readily tied to the theory of core by
viewing the option as setting the conditions for individual and coalitional
rationality. 9" With a strong exit option, a solution encompassing the grand
coalition will be individually rational if the player receives at least as much
as it would by defecting from the coalition. An alternative payoff may be so
large that the other players will not agree to it, such as when the alternative
payoff equals or exceeds the funds available. In this scenario, there will be no
core for the grand coalition, the player with the strong exit option will cut off
bargaining, and it will take the alternative payoff."' But if the exit option is
not too large, the players with weak or no exit options may be able to trans-
fer sufficient utility to the other player to keep it in the coalition. If so, a
solution will be within the core of the game.'" Such a situation might occur
when a player with a strong exit option receives as much as it would through
defecting and when, even after the transfers, the other players receive more
than they would otherwise be able to obtain.
Bargaining in the shadow of exit options provides a ready analogue to class
actions because opt-out rights are quite literally exit options. These rights
technically give all players the ability to opt out to pursue a separate litigation
and thereby to obtain some alternative payoff. The relative strength of the
Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: An hiroduction, 53 REV. ECONOMIC STUD. 709 (1986).
See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 28, at 226.
"' See id. at 228; Baird & Picker, supra note 132, at 319.
", See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340; Michner et al., supra note 102, at 271.
" In a bankruptcy context this might occur when the senior creditor's secured claim exceeds the
assets of the bankruptcy estate. See Baird & Picker, supra note 132. at 311-12.
' See GARDNER, supra note 88. at 401; SHUBIK. GAME THEORY, supra note 89. at 147.
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opt-out rights will then "set the stage for the negotiations between the
parties."'95 Players that expect a significantly greater return from an individ-
ual action have strong exit options. In a constant sum situation, these exit op-
tions give them the possibility of capturing a disproportionately large portion
of the common pool. Indeed, in cases where a defined pool exists from which
class members may recover and where the sum of the potential recoveries
outside the class exceeds the amount in the defined pool, giving opt-out rights
to the class members should create an unstable game without a core. In such
a case, as already illustrated, each player will have a sufficiently strong exit
option that there will be no bargain strictly preferable to exercising their opt-
out rights. Mandatory classing, taxing opt-outs, or other similar strategies
can help prevent an unruly race to judgment because they take away or de-
crease the value of these exit options. A global class resolution is possible
because these devices constrain litigants' bargaining strategies, thereby creat-
ing at least the possibility of finding a core. If there are no opt-out rights or
opt-out rights are restricted, then the amount of expected recovery from an
individual action may become irrelevant to bargaining and the players and the
court can arrive at an equitable distribution of the funds available. 7
Merely because there are opt-out rights does not mean it is impossible to
achieve a core. Core theory does not suggest that any time coalition members
have the power to form intermediate coalitions or singletons that coalitions
will tend to be unstable. Such power is a necessary, but not a sufficient, con-
dition for class instability. In a regime in which opt-out rights are available,
the key issue for determining class stability is coalitional rationality.9 It is
only when the value of staying in the class exceeds the value of pursuing
individual litigation that stable class actions are likely to emerge. If the ex-
pected recovery from opting out is less than the expected recovery from stay-
ing in the class, then opt-out rights will not affect the core.
As suggested previously, opt-out rights are unlikely to affect large-stakes,
small-claims actions because if a player does not have a claim that is viable
as an independent suit, then it is not individually rational for that player to
leave the grand coalition. 9 But not all class actions fall within this para-
' Baird & Picker. supra note 132, at 320.
'u See supra Part IV.B.
"' See Baird & Picker. supra note 132, at 324.
"' See ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
' See supra Part IV.C.
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digm.2"' Many class actions involve a mix of claimants, some of whom can
expect to obtain only modest recoveries and others of whom have much larg-
er damages claims. This heterogeneity increases n in the formula 2" - 1,
thereby increasing exponentially the number of inequalities necessary to find
a core. In these situations, the relative strength of the exit options the players
possess will vary greatly. In other words, in these cases, while the right to opt
out may be universal, the ability to do so will not be. As a practical matter,
this means that smaller claimants may be at a significant disadvantage in
recovering an amount sufficient to compensate them for their injuries, partic-
ularly when a constant sum is available. Adding in transaction or agency
costs may exacerbate the problem.
To see this, we return to the first iteration of the class action model. The
players expect that their recoveries in the class action will be: U, = $300; U,
= $60; U3 = $240. Each player expects that if it could defeat the class action
or opt out of it, it would be able to obtain an additional 25%, such that:
v({1}) = $375; v({2}) = $75; v({3}) = $300. In this case, however, assume
that the cost of opting out of the class action and pursuing an individual ac-
tion is $40 greater than remaining in the class. The player is again the attor-
ney, and she expects to recover one-third of the award, whether in the class
action or in an individual action. In such a case, Players 1 and 3 will have an
incentive to opt out because the cost of pursuing an individual action is less
than the expected increased recovery. These players' expected recoveries
exceed the constant sum available, so they will race to judgment. Player 2 has
no viable opportunity to opt out because the expected gains from opting out
are less than the cost of pursuing an individual suit. In the real world, Player
2's problems are likely to be compounded. With Players I and 3 pursuing in-
dividual actions; the defendant will likely have no incentive to enter into any
settlement that includes only Player 2 because the defendant knows that Play-
er 2 cannot bring an individual action. Player 2, the smallest claimant, may
then be effectively precluded from pursuing any action.
This result arises in part because the class action device was designed to
overcome the problem of dispersed injured parties whose claims were suffi-
ciently small that they lacked the incentives or the ability to bring individual
adjudication;2°" and it is now being applied in cases, like mass tort cases,
" See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 29. at 563-77; see also Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation.
supra note 4, at 904-06.
' See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326. 339 (1980); Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatay
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with a more mixed claimant population. In such cases, agency and transaction
costs may give different subsets of claimants significantly different strategic
alternatives. In a constant sum situation, those who do not have the ability to
opt out of the class action may receive less than they otherwise would if
those who have the ability to opt out can increase their recoveries by doing
so. With a constant sum, any change in distribution of the fund will only be a
reallocation. Any increase to one party who is able to exploit the opt-out
rights comes at the expense of the other claimants who are not able to take
advantage of those rights. Thus Player 2, the kind of small claimant that class
actions are supposed to benefit, may find that it has no realistic way of ob-
taining any recovery for its injuries.
The exit option model, of course, demonstrates that these reallocations do
not necessarily require that parties with the strong exit options actually exer-
cise them. With exit options, large claimants or those that expect significantly
larger recoveries outside the class action may have significant bargaining
power because they possess a credible threat to opt out of the class to pursue
an individual action.02 In these cases, smaller or weaker claimants may tend
to be systematically disadvantaged by a system of opt-out rights. 23 The
credible threat to opt out of a class action may significantly affect the range
of bargaining with respect to the distribution of any recoveries from the de-
fendant.2
4
A useful way to think about these problems is to return to the class action
model and give Player 1 a strong exit option while Players 2 and 3 have only
weak ones. If Player I can obtain v({ I}), then that amount sets a floor to
what Player I must receive to remain in the class.215 If the other class mem-
bers do not offer Player I at least that much, it will be rational for Player I
to opt out and pursue a separate action. -° Such a game may or may not
have a core depending on how large Player 1 's exit option is and the weak-
ness of the other players' bargaining positions. In a case where Player I has
Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969); Macey & Miller. supra note 64, at 8; Schwarzer,
Structuring Multiclaim Litigation, supra note 67, at 1252-53.
• See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 28, at 221.
"' This is certainly true if transaction costs for defendants are greater when they must litigate individu-
al cases rather than a single class action. If the defendant has only $600 available in total assets, any
amounts paid to litigate cases will reduce the total amount available to claimants.
" See Baird & Picker. supra note 132, at 321.
' See id. at 319.
: This of course assumes that Player I is risk-neutral.
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a somewhat strong exit option (but one that is less than the amount of the
entire fund) and the other players have no option but to pursue class litiga-
tion, a core solution may be possible. If, for example, Players 2 and 3 expect
that they can obtain a greater recovery in a class with Player I than they
could if Player I defects, then Players 2 and 3 may be willing to transfer part
of their recovery to Player I to induce it to stay in the class."7
Consider a case where, without exit options, each player expects to recover
a bargained-for share of $200 out of the $600 fund M. Player 1, however, has
a strong exit option and expects to recover $300. Pursuing the individual suit
will require the defendant to expend $100 in legal costs, leaving only $200
for Players 2 and 3 to split. In this situation, it would be irrational for Players
2 and 3 to insist on a recovery of $200 each. If they do, Player 1 will simply
exercise its exit option and recover $300. Assuming that Players 2 and 3 are
similarly situated in terms of their bargaining position with respect to each
other, the likely outcome will be that Players 2 and 3 will each give up $50
to keep Player 1 in the coalition. The value of Player I's exit option sets a
floor on the amount it will receive, and Players 2 and 3 will have to split
whatever amount remains. If Players 2 and 3 have no opportunity for recov-
ery outside a class action that encompasses all three players, they might be
willing to enter into a bargain that gives Player I more than what it would
have received by exercising its exit option."' Game theory cannot predict
which of the distributions within a core, if one exists, the parties will ulti-
mately choose and the court ultimately approve because the actual distribution
will depend on player-specific characteristics such as bargaining skill, relative
levels of risk aversion, and the like.2'
The formal model provides theoretical support for the intuition that provid-
ing an unrestrained right to opt out of a class action as a way to maintain
some semblance of litigative autonomy may impose significant costs on other
claimants, especially when those claimants are competing for a constant sum.
The model does not incorporate costs to the civil justice system that may
arise from multiple, repetitive trials. In cases in which there is no constant
sum and the defendant possesses assets sufficient to cover all jury verdicts or
settlements, then the lack of a core for the grand coalition is not likely to
." This will be especially true in cases in which the defendant is unlikely to settle with a class that
includes only the low value claimants.
" See Baird & Picker. supra note 132. at 322.
' See id. at 324.
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impose costs on competing claimants in the form of reduced recoveries.
Disaggregative strategies, however, are still likely to impose broader costs on
the civil justice system to the extent that such costs are externalities to the
players.1
V. REAL WORLD ANALOGUES
Core theory is not merely the stuff of game theoretic models. Indeed, it is
possible to suggest tentatively that core theory can explain many, and perhaps
all, of the phenomena observed in the real world of class litigation. This
"core completeness conjecture" does not discount the existence of the kinds
of agency costs that have been at the forefront of the academic assessment of
class actions. These costs are real, but they may be explained as aspects of
the core theoretic model and thus may be analytically unnecessary to explain
the observed patterns that have emerged in class litigation. In other words, if
the "core completeness conjecture" is correct, then core theory may be suffi-
cient to explain completely class action dynamics.
This Article does not attempt to analyze exhaustively every aspect of class
action dynamics in order to test thoroughly the validity of the core complete-
ness conjecture. Instead, to explain how core theory can be used in this way,
this Part takes a number of examples that are emblematic of real world class
action phenomena and places them within the broader context of core theory.
This Part also shows how the core theoretic model can be used to model
agency problems. Additionally, it highlights an inherent paradox in class
action litigation that makes the exercise of opt-out rights feasible predomi-
nantly in those cases where there is a significant likelihood that they may
destroy the viability and efficiency of the class.
A. Core Theory and Agency Costs
Agency problems between lawyers and class members may not be neces-
sary to explain class action dynamics. Similar phenomena to those observed
in current class litigation and settlement practices may arise in cases in which
lawyers faithfully represent the interests of all members of the class. To be
sure, an attorney who represents only a subset of clients may implement a
2" See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
1997]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
strategy designed to create a core by constraining some other subset's bar-
gaining space. In this way, the lack of homogeneity within groups that can be
aggregated as classes can create an intraclass loyalty and agency problem that
can devastate traditional notions of equity and fairness. But those problems
arise not because counsel is being an unfaithful champion of her clients'
interests, but precisely because counsel is being absolutely faithful to her
specific clients at the expense of other potential class members.
Before examining the intraclass loyalty problem, consider first a case in
which counsel may be acting in the best interests of all potential claimants by
seeking class certification in a mass tort case. In some of these cases, there
may be significant agency cost problems leading plaintiffs attorneys to pro-
pose class actions to reap the fees associated with being named lead counsel
or to settle the action cheaply.2" But these attorneys may also be acting
consistently with game theoretic concepts of core. In these cases the key is
coalitional rationality. Attorneys may find it rational to pursue collective
procedures when it is in the best interest of every singleton and intermediate
coalition to do so. This idea is consistent with the behavior of attorneys who
seek class certification in mass tort cases that generally have been unsuccess-
ful as individual suits.
Consider In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,"' one of the recent cases in
which an appellate court questioned the utility of mass tort class actions. In
Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner refused to certify a nationwide mandatory class
action brought on behalf of hemophiliacs infected with the AIDS virus from
their use of certain blood solids that the defendant drug companies had
manufactured.' 3 Three hundred lawsuits involving approximately 400 plain-
tiffs had been filed in state and federal courts when the district court certified
a mandatory class action.' 4 That class would have involved significantly
greater numbers than were represented in then pending cases. Indeed, the
class counsel presented evidence that at least half of the United States' hemo-
philiac population (about 10,000 people) were HIV-positive. 5 At the time
2" Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 44-45. Indeed. certain mass tort attorneys have developed reputa-
tions as "quick settlers." Alison Frankel. Et Tu. Stan?, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1994. at 68.
' 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995): see supra notes 54-63 and accompany-
ing text.
" For an extensive discussion of the substantive and procedural history of Rhone-Poulenc. see John-
son. supra note 79, at 2339-46.
" Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296.
"1 Id.
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the mandatory class was certified, thirteen cases had been tried in various
courts around the country, with defendants obtaining judgments in their favor
in twelve of those.
216
In this kind of situation, Judge Posner reasoned that a class action would
be inappropriate because the massive potential exposure from an unfavorable
verdict would create enormous pressure on the defendant to settle, regardless
of the underlying merits of the individual cases.217 Using the hypothetical
numbers Judge Posner used to support this conclusion, we can see that plain-
tiffs' decision to seek class certification may have been coalitionally rational.
Judge Posner reasoned that if the percentage of plaintiffs verdicts remained
constant in later cases, then plaintiffs could expect only a 7.7% chance of
prevailing in any individual case.1 If, as Judge Posner speculated, the dam-
ages in a winning case would be $5 million, then plaintiffs' expected verdict
in an individual case was $385,000. The expected value of pursuing individu-
al litigation would actually be lower because the costs of litigating the indi-
vidual case would have to be subtracted and the expected recovery would
have to be reduced to present value."9 In terms of the game theoretic mod-
el, the value of any singleton, or individual coalition, pursuing a stand-alone
trial was relatively small.
Pursuing adjudication through a class action, however, would produce a
greater expected value for two reasons. First, a mandatory class action might
increase the number of plaintiffs from 400 to perhaps 5,000.220 At $5 mil-
lion per plaintiff, this suggests a potential recovery of $25 billion for the
class. Multiplying that number by the 7.7% chance of winning gives the
plaintiffs an expected recovery of $1.925 billion reduced by litigation costs
and reduced to present value. Thus, merely by increasing the number of af-
fected parties, plaintiffs were able to increase substantially the value of the
case.
More importantly, by forming a large coalition, plaintiffs may have been
able to gain significant bargaining leverage over defendants. Judge Posner
reasoned that defendants faced with a potential $25 billion jury verdict and
possible bankruptcy would not be willing to gamble that a jury would have
2I Id.
' Id. at 1297-98.
2i. Id. at 1299-1300.
" See Posner, supra note 140, at 417-20; see also supra note 139.
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
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rendered a verdict in their favor, even if they had a 92.3% chance of prevail-
ing . ' There would be intense settlement pressure on defendants that would
not otherwise exist if plaintiffs could not combine forces through collective
action.-- Essentially, this settlement pressure created value unavailable to
plaintiffs that proceeded singly. It was thus coalitionally rational for plaintiffs
to form a grand coalition because the value of that coalition was greater than
the value that any plaintiff would expect to receive by going it alone or join-
ing intermediate coalitions. 23 Each plaintiff would strictly prefer the grand
coalition. In this case, the grand coalition had a solution in the core, explain-
ing why plaintiffs sought mandatory certification.2 4
The validity of the core theoretic analysis of class actions in no way de-
pends on the absence of agency costs. The core theoretic model recognizes
that these costs are real and exist in many class actions. Indeed, the core
theoretic model is sufficiently robust that it can easily be adapted to model
the effect that agency costs will have on class action dynamics. Take for
example the situation in which an attorney represents more than one type of
claimant. In this situation, a de facto intermediate coalition is formed if the
attorney is able to make strategic decisions with little or no monitoring from
her clients. Significant agency costs may be imposed on the clients because
il d.
Id. Other courts have expressed similar concerns. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay. 437 U.S. 463.
476 (1978); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85
(3d Cir.), cert. denied. 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
- See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 383; ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
The plaintiffs' desire for class certification in Castano v. Amnerican Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544
(E.D. La. 1995), rev'd 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). in which the district court certified a class action con-
sisting of every addicted smoker in the United States, is susceptible to a similar analysis. In past individual
litigation, plaintiff's attorneys had been singularly unsuccessful in recovering significant damages in product
liability litigation against cigarette manufacturers. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal Histoty of the Tobacco
Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 854 (1992). Under these conditions, the value of a singleton pursu-
ing a lawsuit against a cigarette manufacturer, as with attorneys representing hemophiliacs infected with the
AIDS virus, is quite. likely low, and indeed may be less than the cost of the suit given the vigorous defenses
that are typical in these cases.
Class status would have increased the stakes in the Castano because it would have resolved the rights
of many more smokers than would have been likely to bring suit individually. Moreover, the defendants'
downside was potentially much greater, thus giving the plaintiffs significant additional bargaining leverage
and increasing the value of their cases. For these reasons, the value to each attorney in the consortium prose-
cuting the case was greater with a grand coalition of smokers than if each brought individual suits, or small-
er class actions. See Milo Geyelin. Laivers Battling the Tobacco Industiy Are Confronting Logistical Night-
mare, WALL ST. J.. May 28, 1996, at A24 (noting that after the Fifth Circuit's decision decertifying the
class action, the decision of the plaintiffs' consortium to pursue separate class actions in approximately 40
states was "likely [to] add years to the litigation and millions of dollars in costs"). As is discussed infi-a in
Part V.B. not all mass tort class actions will follow this pattern.
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the attorney, as the strategic decisionmaker, may seek to promote her best in-
terests ahead of one or both groups of clients. Indeed, in game theoretic
terms, if the attorney makes the decisions for both parties, then those parties
should in reality be considered a single player.
This kind of agency cost problem may have existed in Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc. 22s In that case, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's certification of a settlement class action negotiated between the Cen-
ter for Claims Resolution (CCR), a consortium of former asbestos manufac-
turers,'22'6 and a class consisting solely of "future claimants," those who had
been exposed to asbestos manufactured or sold by the CCR defendants but
who had not yet brought suit. 7 In a settlement class action, the defendants
and plaintiffs negotiate a settlement of a particular case either before the class
is certified or sometimes before the action is brought.22' A complaint, an-
swer, and a proposed settlement agreement are then filed, and the court is
asked to approve the settlement. Defendants agree that they will not oppose
class certification if the settlement is approved as negotiated. 29
On appeal, it was alleged that class counsel had a significant conflict of
interest that prohibited approval of the settlement. 30 Class counsel in
Georgine represented not only future claimants who were members of the
proposed settlement class-they also represented a large number of present
claimants.2"3 While seeking conditional certification of the future-only class
and approval of the proposed settlement, defendants also entered into a settle-
', 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379
(1996).
' The CCR was formed to seek resolution of claims through mechanisms that did not involve lengthy
and expensive litigation. See Coffee, Class Wa,. supra note 4. at 1388.
' The settlement was facilitated by the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Liti-
gation report which concluded that the backlog of asbestos cases could only be resolved through "aggregate
or class proceedings." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 19 (Mar. 1991). Responding to that recommendation.
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all pending asbestos personal injury cases to the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Georgine. 83 F.3d at 619 (citing hi re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
VI). 771 F. Supp. 415, 424 (J.P.M.L. 1991)). For a complete history of the legal proceedings and negotia-
tions that led up to the Geomine settlement, see Coffee, Class Wars. supra note 4. at 1388-99.
- See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4, at 1378-82.
" See Cramton, supra note 12, at 823.
'" Georgine, 83 F.3d at 622-23.
~'I&
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ment with class counsel pursuant to which they agreed to settle their entire
inventory of claims for approximately $215 million. 2
The appellate court did not base its decision on the agency cost issue, and
it refused to determine whether any conflict in fact existed. -3 If there were
significant agency cost problems in this case, as a number of scholarly com-
mentators have speculated, 4 then those costs are easily encompassed within
the core theoretic model. In the core theoretic model the attorney is the rele-
vant player, and her expected attorney's fee award under different strategy
choices will be the relevant value used in determining which strategy to fol-
low. In core theoretic terms, the separate settlements in Georgine for present
and future claimants are best understood as one global settlement encompass-
ing both groups. Indeed, if the attorney is making the strategic decisions for
both groups, then the game is best understood as involving only one player,
the attorney who represented both groups. As a matter of core theory, such
actions are easier to settle globally because there is only one inequality that
needs to be satisfied. The single player will simply take the action that pro-
vides it with the greatest recovery. -3
Core theory thus strongly suggests that in situations where single attorneys
represent heterogeneous groups of claimants who do not have the ability to
monitor and prevent attorney opportunism, global resolutions may be signifi-
cantly simpler to achieve. These resolutions may come at a substantial cost,
however, because attorneys may attempt to increase their recoveries by set-
tling the different clients' claims differently. Intraclass loyalty problems of
this sort may also arise in situations where no agency costs are present. Dif-
' Id. at 622; see Coffee, Class Wars. supra note 4, at 1392.
" Georgine. 83 F.3d at 630.
,_ See Coffee, Class Wars. supra note 4. at 1393-99; Koniak. supra note 13, at 1051-57. 1078-86.
"" The core theoretic model used here can be rather easily modified to analyze situations in which at
least some of the class members have the ability to participate in the strategic decisionmaking. In such a
case, those class members are simply made players. Consider a securities class action in which one class
counsel represents the entire class, which consists of a mixed group of institutional investors and small
claimants. Collective action problems create rational apathy problems for the small claimants, and the attor-
ney effectively makes all strategic decisions for them. The institutional investors, however, may have an
incentive to monitor the class attorney because they will tend to have larger claims than other members and
because they may be able to achieve positive portfolio effects from deterring nonmeritorious litigation. See
Grundfest & Perino. supra note 29, at 600-04; Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman. Let the Monyic Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE'
L.J. 2053 (1995). In this situation, the relevant players will be the class attorney and the institutions. Agency
costs can also be modeled by making the faithless counsel and her client separate players. This increases the
number of inequalities necessary for finding a core. See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 398.
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ferent subclasses may be represented by separate attorneys and those attorneys
may faithfully represent the interests of the subclass. In so doing, they may
attempt to restrict the bargaining space of other players. As we saw in the
previous Part, the presence of strong opt-out rights among a small group of
claimants may create opportunities to create a core by requiring weak claim-
ants to make sidepayments to strong ones.
The proposed global breast implant settlement may be an example of such
a situation. One prominent commentator has noted that the settlement process
in that case did not seem to be collusive, but rather provided "a commendable
example of a mass tort litigation that was structured reasonably and super-
vised intensively by the federal court. 236 The initial negotiated settlement in
that case, however, ceased to be viable after too many high-stakes present
claimants opted out of it to pursue individual litigation.237 Pursuant to a pro-
vision in the settlement agreement, the parties attempted to renegotiate the
settlement to provide more money to the present claimants "perhaps by reduc-
ing the funds payable to future claimants. '23 ' Future claimants are likely to
have significantly weaker exit options than high-stakes present claimants.
Thus, the relative strength of the exit options in the breast implant case might
provide a better explanation for any attempt to redistribute settlement shares
than any agency costs.
B. Opt-Outs and the Class Action Paradox
Core theory highlights a paradox concerning opt-outs and the ability to
maintain a stable coalition. As demonstrated in the previous Part, opt-out
rights can act as powerful bargaining tools that can dramatically shift power
within the class. But, as this Part explains, opt-out rights are least likely to
function in this manner in the consumer and other large-stakes, small-claims
class actions where claims for individual autonomy are weakest. Unfortunate-
ly, these are among the cases in which agency costs have often been a sig-
nificant concern. In mass tort cases that typically have strong claims for indi-
vidual autonomy, a significant number of claimants are likely to have a feasi-
ble opportunity to opt out, and opt-out rights are the most likely to disrupt
Coffee, Class Wars,. supra note 4, at 1404; see also Cramton, supra note 12, at 828 (noting that
settlement negotiations in the breast implant litigation were "reasonably open, participatory and reliable").
2"7 See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4, at 1408-10; see also infra notes 266-87 and accompanying
text for a core theoretic analysis of the opt-outs from the breast implant settlement.
" Schuck. supra note 4, at 942-43 n.6.
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class-wide resolutions. Thus, recognition of opt-out rights in cases in which
they are feasibly employed can destroy the effectiveness of the class action
mechanism.
Consider first the large-stakes, small-claims class action in which each
individual claimant has a relatively small potential recovery. In these cases,
transaction costs prevent any class member from pursuing an individual ac-
tion because the fixed costs of litigation exceed the expected recovery 3 9 As
a result, the opportunity and transaction costs for an attorney to try an indi-
vidual action, rather than settling through the class mechanism, are greater
than the attorney's expected fee award.4 Under these conditions, no attor-
ney is likely to try the case.
In terms of core theory, the expected payoff for claimants from defecting
from the grand coalition is likely to be zero. Although claimants have a theo-
retical right to opt out, they have no practical ability to do so. As a result, the
first three inequalities that are necessary for establishing a core are satis-
fied.241  Every potential defector will strictly prefer remaining in the class
action because the payoffs from forming a singleton or intermediate coalition
are lower than those available in the grand coalition.242 Whether in such a
case a core is present for a grand coalition consisting of all class members
- RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 569-70 (4th ed. 1992).
.' Again, the analysis is similar to that made in choosing whether to settle or try a case. Judge Posner
has described this latter analysis as follows:
Suppose a defendant offers $100,000, the contingent fee is 30 percent regardless of when the
litigation ends, and the lawyer is sure he can get a judgment for $120.000 if the case is tried but
knows that it will cost him, in time and other expenses, $8,000 to try it. His client will be better
off if the case is tried, for after paying the lawyer's fee he will put $84,000 in his pocket rather
than $70.000 if it is settled. But the lawyer will be worse off. since his additional fee, $6,000
($36,000-$30,000) will be less than the trial costs of $8,000 that he must incur.
Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1983). rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. I (1985): see also
Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 4, at 887.
-" These three inequalities are:
v(1 I D -< u.
v(121) < u.,
v(13}) < u.
They are likely satisfied n this case because where an individual, independent suit is not viable, the
value of v({ I}) = v(12}) = v(13)) = 0.
2' See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 383; ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340; Wiley. supra note 89, at
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will thus depend on whether intermediate coalitions have the ability to break
off from the class to obtain some greater value. 43
Core theory supports the observation that opt-out rights are not likely to
destabilize class' actions involving relatively small individual stakes or where
the variance between the expected recovery in the class action and the indi-
vidual action is low.2" Indeed, this observation is consistent with anecdotal
evidence of the low opt-out rate that generally prevails in large-scale, small-
stakes class action litigation. 45 A low opt-out rate in these cases is consis-
tent with core theory because the value of pursuing an individual action or an
action through an intermediate coalition is likely to be less than the value of
the expected recovery in the class action, especially in those cases where
attorneys' fees and other transaction costs are likely to approach or exceed
the expected recovery in the individual suits. 6 In game theoretic terms, the
only solutions to these games are those that leave no individual in a position
to improve its payoffs by defecting from the grand coalition to strike off on
its own or to form an intermediate coalition.2 Although real world applica-
tions are not likely to precisely mirror the theory, it is reasonable to expect
that in tort or other class claims involving relatively little property damage or
relatively small individual losses, there are likely to be few opt-outs.2 8
In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litigation exemplifies such a
large-scale, small-stakes consumer class action.249 That case involved allega-
tions of resale price maintenance that improperly raised the prices of certain
small appliances. At most, such a scheme raised prices for consumer-plaintiffs
' See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 401; SHUBIK, GAME THEORY, supra note 89, at 147.
" See Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 28 n. 86: Schwarzer, Sirtrcuring Multiclain Litigation. sit-
pra note 67, at 1256.
2 See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (observing that "we would be naive not
to recognize that where (as here) the maximum amount recoverable on behalf of each of thousands of stock-
holders would be quite small, those receiving notice would in all probability not have enough incentive to
take any action"), Abraham L. Pomerantz & William E. Haudek, Clas Actions, 2 REV. OF SEC. REG. 937.
940 (1969) ("As a practical matter, in class actions brought up to now, the percentage of persons seeking
exclusion or to be represented by their own counsel has been extremely small. Most members of the class
are usually content to let the aggressive plaintiff and his lawyer represent their interests, particularly in cases
involving a large class where individual members do not have much of a stake.").
. See Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 28.
'' See GARDNER, supra note 88, at 383; ORDESHOOK, supra note 89, at 340.
-" It is reasonable to expect defendants to oppose class certification because they may expect relatively
few potential claimants to maintain individual suits if a class is not certified. Defendants will thus expect to
pay significantly less in damages if a class is not certified. It is individually rational for defendants to op-
pose aggregative litigation in these cases.
-" 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 446 (D. Conn. 1983).
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from $32 to $75 per unit.25 Even with treble damages, no individual con-
sumer or even subgroups of consumers would likely be able to pursue viable
separate actions. As a result, even though the settlement approved by the
court only provided coupons for 50% off the purchase price of another of the
defendant's products, fewer than 1,000 of the 1.5 million class members ob-
jected to or opted out of the settlement.
Some commentators suggest that the Cuisinart case is emblematic of the
kinds of inadequate settlements that agency costs in class action litigation
may generate. 2  If this conclusion is accurate, then this settlement may be
consistent with the core theoretic result that under certain circumstances inad-
equate settlements may not prompt significant opt-outs. 253 In these cases,
because independent suits are unlikely to be viable, it will be rational for
claimants to remain in the class action because an inadequate payoff is still
preferable to no payoff at all.
The difficulty, and the first half of a class action paradox that core theory
highlights, is that although opt-outs are not likely to cause an unstable coali-
tion in such a class action, permitting them is also unlikely to create many
benefits for the class. Even if as a general matter opt-out rights can provide a
check against inadequate or collusive settlements by allowing class members
to "vote with their feet," rational apathy problems in these kinds of cases are
unlikely to make that check an effective one. 4 It is precisely these cases,
when the plaintiffs' small stakes create insufficient incentives to monitor
class counsel, that present the greatest danger for opportunistic behavior. 5
The other half of the class action paradox is that in cases in which opt-out
rights are thought to be the most important, these rights are most likely to
Ie Id. at 449.
" Id. at 454. Specifically, 45 class members objected to the settlement, 89 requested to be excluded to
avoid the res judicata effect of the settlement, and 825 opted out for other reasons (including I I I who did
not wish to pursue any action against the company). Id.
See Macey & Miller. supra note 64, at 45 n.131.
z' See supra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
. Macey & Miller. supra note 64, at 19-20; see Coffee, Understanding the Plaintifs ,4torne., supra
note 64, at 679-80. Other problems, especially the significant problem of providing a meaningful notice to
claimants that is understandable and clearly explains the legal options open to them, may contribute to the
low opt-out rate in these cases. See Miller & Crump, supra note 24, at 16-23. In low-stakes class actions,
however, the economic forces that reduce the incentive to opt out are likely to prevail, even if the notice
perfectly informed class members of their options. Indeed, if the notice were perfect, claimants would realize
that opt-out was not a viable option given the low expected recovery available to claimants.
"5 See Macey & Miller. supra note 64, at 19-20.
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create an unstable class coalition. These include mass tort class actions in-
volving personal injuries in which opt-out rights are thought to be necessary
to protect litigative autonomy. Core theory suggests that inherently unstable
class coalitions are more likely in cases where the payoffs from defecting are
large enough to cover the costs associated with pursuing an individual action.
It is not difficult to suggest situations in high-stakes mass tort cases in which
players may expect to obtain a recovery in excess of what might otherwise be
available in a class action. Certainly, if punitive damages may be recoverable,
then a plaintiff obtaining an early judgment may be able to obtain a dispro-
portionate share of those damages, as the courts advocating the punitive dam-
ages overkill theory have suggested." 6
Compensatory damages can also vary significantly between class and indi-
vidualized recovery for a variety of reasons,'257 some of which may be inde-
pendent of the sufficiency of the proposed class recovery. Variance between
jury awards may potentially be significant.2 8 As a practical matter, different
" See it re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo. 1982), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir. 1982); see also In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 418-20 (J.P.M.L.
1991) (noting that multiple awards of punitive damages to present claimants may deny recovery to future
claimants).
-' Studies of asbestos litigation have found that, all other factors being equal, claims that began trial
received 2.28 times more compensation than similar claims settled before trial. JAMES S. KAKALIK Er AL.,
VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 58-59 (1984). Moreover. compensation
per claim tended to decrease as the number of plaintiffs in a lawsuit increased. M. at 61-63; see McGovern,
supra note 64, at 667. Professor McGovern has noted that in Jenkins v. Raymnark hidus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th
Cir. 1986), an asbestos class action, 52 of 805 potential class members opted out, in part because their at-
tomeys were "afraid that any lump-sum resolution would shortchange their clients." McGovern, srtpra note
64, at 667. As it turned out, these perceptions may not have been inaccurate. Jenkins was settled after 20
days of trial for a total of $137 million. Id. at 671. On average, the awards to plaintiffs in the class action
cases were 25% lower than the mean of prior settlement values. Id. at 671.
" See In re School Asbestos Litig.. 789 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (3d Cir. 1986); hI re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 107, 810 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on othergrounls, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1992), arodified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); DEBORAH H. HENSLER ET AL.. ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE
CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS xix (1985).
The Rand Institute has also conducted a number of empirical studies concerning the factors that may
account for variations in jury verdicts. See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON. DEEP POCKETS. EMPTY
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURIES (1985): MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON,
COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980 (1983).
While these studies do not attempt to assess whether different verdicts were adequate or inadequate, they do
suggest that the size of verdicts may vary depending on factors that may not be relevant to the merits. For
example, one study reported a "modest deep pocket" effect with respect to plaintiffs that did not suffer se-
vere injuries. CHIN & PETERSON, supra, at vi-vii, 41-49. This effect was found to be "far stronger when
plaintiffs were severely injured." Id. Not only did corporations pay significantly more in those cases than in
other types of cases, they were also more likely than other defendants to be found liable. I. Although not
conclusive, these findings suggest the possibility that differently situated plaintiffs might have incentives to
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juries may arrive at significantly different damage calculations, in large part
due to the vague standards for awarding nonpecuniary damages that typically
apply in tort cases."9 Anecdotal evidence suggests that juries in certain ju-
risdictions have reputations for awarding significantly higher amounts to tort
plaintiffs than those in other jurisdictions.2° The presence in certain juris-
dictions of substantial awards in similar cases might cause attorneys to bring
individual cases there or to seek individualized adjudication of claims pending
there.26'
Whether as an empirical matter the perception that certain jurisdictions tend
to produce higher awards is correct,22 the actual amount of settlements is
likely to be affected by those perceptions. Settlements in jurisdictions with
reputations for higher jury awards may tend to be higher on average and over
time than in jurisdictions without such reputations. Indeed, the presence of
large, well-publicized jury awards in similar cases may encourage opt-outs if
the compensation through the class action mechanism is viewed as out of line
with the earlier award. In other words, it may be irrelevant that an individual
award was potentially excessive if it provides a benchmark against which all
future claimants will measure proposed settlements.263
opt out of a class action because of the prospect of a jury award higher than the recovery they expect in the
class action, regardless of whether the class action recovery is adequate.
Moreover, in the mass tort context, some anecdotal evidence suggests that juries may be willing to
award damages even though a plaintiff may not have proven all of the elements of its claim. See Frontline:
Breast Implants on Trial (PBS Television Broadcast, Feb. 27, 1996), available on the Internet at
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/Frontlineimplants>.
I" See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 160 (1996): Randal R. Bovbjerg et al.,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering. "83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) (proposing
alternative standards for valuation of noneconomic damages in tort cases).
2" See McGovern, supra note 64, at 664; Laurie P. Cohen, Southern Esposure: Lawyer Gets hivestoms
to Sue GE. Prudential in Poor Border Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at AI; Christian Harlan, Third
Nine-Figure Award Suggests that Big Is Big with Teras Juries, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1992, at B8; Walter
Olson, Rule of Law.: A Sinall Canadian Firm Meets the American Tort Monster, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1996,
at A 15 (noting reputations of Mississippi and Alabama for awarding large punitive damages against out-of-
state corporations): Roger Parloff. An American Plaintiffs' Paradise, AM. LAW., May 1991. at 64: Gary
Taylor, Is It the Best Little Plaintiffs' City in Texas?. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 8; see also Polaris Inv.
Mgmt. Corp. v. Abascal, 890 S.W.2d 486. 487-89 (Tex. App. 1994) (Rickhoff, J.. concurring). J. Stephen
Barrick, Comment. Moriel and the Eremplarv Damages Act: Texas Tag-Tean Overhauls Punitive Damages,
32 Hous. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1995).
2' Gary Taylor, Breast Implant Suits Pouring in After $25 Million Verdict, NAT'L L.J.. Jan. 18, 1993,
at 3.
-'- Some evidence suggests that this perception may not be correct. See SHANLEY & PETERSON. supra
note 258, at ix-xi; KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 257, at x-xi.
' One benefit of global resolution, as Professor McGovern has persuasively argued, is that it allows
for court-appointed experts to study the variables that drove outcomes in previous cases to arrive at a fair
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Other factors may create additional incentives to opt out of class litigation
regardless of whether the class mechanism provides the plaintiff with suffi-
cient compensation. For example, an attorney's ethical obligation to zealously
advocate his clients' best interests may cause him to opt his clients out of a
class action if the attorney expects a higher recovery in an individual ac-
tion.2M The incentives for certain attorneys to opt their clients out of the
class action may be enhanced by the split in the mass tort bar between the
firms that concentrate on representing severely injured claimants with poten-
tially high damage claims and "wholesalers" who tend to represent large
groups of claimants for whom they seek settlements en masse.25 Attorneys
in the former group should have greater incentives to seek individual adjudi-
cation of their clients' claims, especially if those attorneys are highly skilled
trial attorneys or negotiators who expect to be able to obtain greater recover-
ies for their clients than are available through aggregative methods.
Mass torts cases involving significant personal injuries are likely to exhibit
many of these characteristics. Take for example the silicone gel breast im-
plant class action and settlement. As Professor Coffee has noted, that settle-
ment "provides an object lesson in the fragility of mass tort settlements-at
least when present claimants are able to opt out."'2' The history of this liti-
gation and the disintegration of the global settlement have been described in
great detail elsewhere and will not be reiterated at great length here. '7 An
examination of some of the basic facts, however, reveals a pattern of opt-outs
that may be consistent with game theoretic concepts of core.
In September 1993, an approximately $4.23 billion global settlement was
announced.21 It was estimated at that time that class members would re-
value for resolving the remaining cases. See McGovern, supra note 64, at 692-93. Broad sampling has the
benefit of reducing the effects of any outlier jury awards. When these findings are used to establish claim
schedules that resolution facilities can use to process remaining claims, there is a greater probability that
similar claims will be treated similarly, rather than being subjected to the vagaries of the jury system. See i.
Of course, such consistency for the remaining cases is only possible if all cases are subject to the same pro-
cedures, i.e.. if no claimants are allowed to opt out into the individualized tort system.
2' See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 7 (1980); see also irl. at EC 7-1
("each member of society is entitled ... to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means and
to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.").
' See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1365; Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 4, at
912-14.
., Coffee. Class Was. supra note 4, at 1405.
: See id. at 1404-10; Hensler & Peterson. supra note 4, at 992-98; Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation,
FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 60; Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation: Dow Corning Succumbs, FORTUNE, Oct.
30, 1995. at 137.
2" See hi re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist.
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ceive between $200,000 and $2 million under the settlement, depending on
the type and severity of their injury. 69 In April 1994, the court provisional-
ly certified a (b)(3) class action for settlement purposes and gave preliminary
approval to the proposed settlement. 7' As with all Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tions, claimants had the right to opt out of the settlement and pursue individu-
alized adjudication. The settlement, however, provided an additional opt-out
opportunity. If higher than expected claim filings *caused projected scheduled
benefits to be reduced, then plaintiffs would again have the opportunity to opt
out into the individualized tort system. The court approved the settlement in
September 1994.27
The opt-out provisions were a recipe for disaster in core theoretic terms,
and they foreshadowed the ultimate demise of the global settlement. Indeed,
the fragility of the breast implant settlement was almost certainly due to both
the larger than expected number of claimants seeking recovery from the set-
tlement fund and the procedural mechanisms put in place within the settle-
ment agreement that permitted escape from the collectivized procedure.
At the time the court gave final approval to the settlement, some 7800
domestic claimants and 6500 foreign claimants opted out of the litigation, or
approximately five percent of the total number of identified, putative class
members. -2 This number, although relatively small, was significantly higher
than appears typical for small claims class actions. More important than the
raw numbers, the character of the opt-out cases is consistent with the predic-
tions the class action model generated. Under that model, it would be individ-
ually rational for class members to opt out of the global settlement if they
expected a sufficiently high recovery outside the class action to cover oppor-
tunity and other costs associated with pursuing an individualized litigation.
Under the approved settlement, high-stakes claimants could expect a maxi-
mum recovery of $1.4 million, net of attorney's fees, without a showing of
causation.273 Although substantial, especially in light of the weak causal link
LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. I, 1994).
:' Coffee, Class Wars. supra note 4, at 1407-08.
_' See Silicone Gel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521. at *1.
" Id. at *1-2.
7 Id. at *17.
" Id. at *5. Claimants at the lower end of the damage sc'hedule could expect to receive about
$105,000. Id. These numbers represented substantial reductions from the amounts originally contemplated
when the settlement was first proposed. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. As more claimants reg-
istered under the terms of the global settlement, these figures were further reduced. See ini'a note 284. Al-
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between breast implants and the autoimmune diseases2 4 that were the basis
for the largest scheduled damage recoveries,2- the settlements were still far
below some of the jury verdicts that had been awarded in individual cases.
For example, in December 1991, a California jury awarded $7.3 million to a
plaintiff who alleged that her implants caused an autoimmune disorder. -76 In
late 1992, a Texas state court jury arrived at a total verdict, including puni-
tive damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees, of $28 million. 7
Another Texas jury awarded three plaintiffs $27.9 million in March 1994.271
A third Texas jury awarded $5.2 million to a woman and her husband in
February 1995.279 In November 1995, a Nevada plaintiff obtained a $14
million jury verdict.20
though the effect of these additional claimants was substantial, and itself was consistent with basic core
theoretic concepts, it may not have affected the original opt-outs greatly. See Gina Kolata, A Case ofJustice.
or a Total Travesty?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jun. 13, 1995, at DI (noting that by October 1994, one month after the
settlement had been approved. 145,000 women had registered for inclusion in the global settlement, far
fewer than the over 400,000 who eventually registered).
2' Epidemiological studies have found either a weak association between breast implants and the more
serious conditions the implants allegedly caused, such as connective-tissue diseases, or no association at all.
See. e.g.. S. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders- After Breast Implant([-
ion, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1697 (1994); J. Goldman et al., Breast Implants. Rheumatoid Arthritis and
Connective-Tissue Diseases in a Clinical Practice, 48 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 571 (1995); Charles H.
Hennekens et al., SeIf-Reported Breast Implants and Connective-Tissue Diseases in Female Health Profes-
sional. A Retrospective Cohort Study. 275 JAMA 616 (1996); J. Sanchez-Guerrero et al.. Silicone Breast
hnplants and the Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Sy'mptoms. 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1666 (1995);
B. Strom et al., Breast Silicone Implants and the Risk of Svstemic Lupus Erithemnatosus, 47 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1697 (1994); see also American College of Rheumatology, Statement on Silicone Breast
Implants (Oct. 22, 1995); Marian Segal, Newrs About Breast Implants FDA Consumer, Nov. 1995, at 11, 12
(noting that: (I) studies do not "rule out the possibility that a subset of women with implants may have a
small increased risk of these conditions, or that some women might develop other immune-related symptoms
that don't conform to 'classic' disease descriptions," and (2) studies did not address other matters, such as
rupture rates or incidence of capsular contracture, i.e., shrinking of scar tissue around the implant).
These studies have excluded any large risk of connective-tissue disease as a result of having breast
implants. Although the latest and most extensive of the studies suggested a possible small increase in such
diseases resulting from implant surgery, that finding may have been the result of bias due to differential
overreporting of connective-tissue diseases or selective participation by women with breast implants. See
Hennekens, et al., supra. at 616.
... Silicone Gel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *19-28.
2" See Hensler & Peterson. supra note 4, at 994.
2f, See id. at 996.
." See Bamaby J. Feder, 3 Are Awarded $27.9 Million in Inplant Trial, N.Y. TIMES. Mar. 4, 1994, at
A 16.
2. See $5 Million for Implant Leak, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1995, at A20.
2",' See Frontline: Breast Implants on Trial. (PBS Television Broadcast, Feb. 27, 1996), available on
the Internet at <http://www.pbs.org /wgbh/pages!Frontline/implants>.
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Under these circumstances, core theory would predict that class members
with claims a jury might find sympathetic or claims that arose in jurisdictions
that had previously awarded significant damages would find it rational to opt
out. These claimants might reasonably anticipate that ihey would be better off
pursuing an individual action rather than accepting the comparatively small
sums available through the negotiated settlement. In other words, in these
cases the value of a singleton or an intermediate coalition would exceed the
value of maintaining the grand coalition. In large part, this appears to be what
happened with respect to the claimants who opted out as of the time the set-
tlement was approved. A large percentage of the opt-out cases were pending
in Texas, which had a reputation for large jury awards in tort cases generally
and also had some of the highest jury awards in litigated breast implant cas-
es.28" ' Many of the opt-out claimants were represented by a well-known tort
lawyer who had obtained some of the largest breast implant jury awards and
who had a reputation for pursuing a disaggregative strategy in mass tort cas-
es.282 Although the fact that plaintiffs were not required to prove causation
might have been a significant inducement to stay in the class in some cases,
the large jury awards appeared to demonstrate that a weak causation case was
not a significant impediment in individual litigation.
The additional opt-out right that came into play if too many claimants
registered claims with the global settlement merely compounded these prob-
lems by giving more claimants a strategy for exiting the collective once it
was no longer individually rational to remain in it. By spring 1995, some
435,000 claimants filed notices of eligibility, far in excess of what the parties
had predicted.23 The plethora of claims significantly reduced the potential
recoveries that claimants could expect from the settlement.284 In terms of
core theory, this meant that the shrinking value of the recovery through the
class coalition was making the value that could be obtained through single-
2" See Frankel, supra note 211. at 80.
. See id.
'" See Coffee, Class Wars. supra note 4. at 1408. The high claim rates, when viewed in light of the
apparently weak causal link between breast implants and autoimmune diseases (the most serious injury the
implants have allegedly caused), lends some credence to the intuition that adverse selection may cause many
weak claimants to seek recovery in a mass tort class action than might otherwise file individual claims. See
supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. This is not to say that plaintiffs brought knowingly false claims.
Rather, claimants may have attributed symptoms to breast implants that were in fact caused by something
else.
_. By the summer of 1995, so many claimants had registered that claimants could expect to receive at
most $70,000 (down from the $1.4 million expected when the settlement was given final approval) or at
least $5250 (down from $105,000). See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4. at 1408 n.259.
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tons or intermediate coalitions more attractive. The effect of voluminous
claims is much the same as in the class action model where the opt-out of
one high-stakes class member causes a cascading effect that further
destabilizes the coalition. "85 In either case, as the amount of the potential re-
covery from the class coalition decreases, it becomes rational for more and
more class members to opt out. The large number of plaintiffs flocking to the
settlement would likely have caused even more claimants to opt out had Dow
Coming, the principal defendant, not filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy peti-
tion. 86 This filing significantly reduced the value of opting out because the
automatic stay in bankruptcy meant that claimants would not be able to ob-
tain jury verdicts against Dow Coming. 87
VI. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CORE THEORETIC ANALYSIS
Core theoretic analysis gives rise to a number of important insights for
understanding and structuring global class resolutions. Among the most im-
portant of these insights is that opt-out rights often do not serve their intend-
ed purpose, and that they may have to be curtailed in order for the aggrega-
tive mechanism to be practically effective. As a result, core theory strongly
suggests that courts should not be reticent to curtail opt-out rights or impose
mandatory classes under appropriate circumstances. Indeed, even using settle-
ment classes as a mechanism for constraining bargaining options might be
appropriate provided that those classes are subject to aggressive oversight by
the judiciary to avoid collusive settlements.
The core theoretic model demonstrates the need to think with care about
just what is being accomplished by maintaining a hybrid system that attempts
to combine both individualization and collectivization. It is all too easy to
view such a system as one that simply maintains the symbolic importance of
litigative autonomy. Core theory gives a much more textured view of opt-out
rights, and suggests that in certain circumstances these rights can impose real
costs on some class members. Core theory strongly suggests that attempting
to maintain individual autonomy in this fashion may be fundamentally incom-
patible with globally resolving many mass tort class actions in which some
" See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
" See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 4, at 1409-10. Attorneys for Dow Coming have cited the signif-
icant number of opt-outs as one reason for its bankruptcy filing. See Alison Frankel, Dow Coming Goes for
Broke, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 80.
2" See Coffee, Class Wars. supra note 4, at 1409.
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claimants have the potential for significantly higher returns outside the class.
Because these kinds of claimants are the only ones who have the practical
ability to opt out, preserving that right may do little more than create a for-
mal system of litigative autonomy that fails to provide true litigative autono-
my to all claimants. Moreover, many of the efficiency benefits that might be
realized through global litigation may be lost, and many smaller claimants
may suffer harm if those who have the practical ability to opt out are able to
obtain disproportionately large portions of the common pool of assets that are
available to compensate all claimants.
Core theory also demonstrates that many of the instrumental benefits that
opt-out rights theoretically provide may be illusory. For many kinds of claim-
ants and in many kinds of class actions, opt-out rights are likely to have a
negligible ability to provide a reliable market test for the adequacy of a pro-
posed class action settlement. Core theoretic concepts provide a formal theory
to support the empirical observation that few if any claimants will opt out of
consumer class actions or other class actions involving large stakes but small
claims. 28 In these cases, it will simply not be individually rational for any
claimant to opt out because its recovery will be less than even a small and
inadequate recovery in the class. In mass tort cases, core theoretic concepts of
individual rationality suggest that opting out is only an option for claimants
who expect to increase significantly their recoveries outside of the class. Due
to the highly variable nature of tort awards, the group with the practical
ability to opt out may not be representative of the class as a whole. For this
reason, any evidence of inadequacy to be drawn from significant numbers of
opt-outs may not be generalizable to the class as a whole. In other words,
while a significant number of opt-outs may demonstrate that high-stakes
claimants are not receiving amounts comparable to what they could obtain in
individual tort cases, such evidence may or may not be relevant to assessing
the overall fairness of a settlement.
Consequently, there appears to be little reason to maintain opt-out rights to
battle collusive settlements when better protection may be afforded to such
class members "by ensuring that they receive vigorous and faithful vicarious
representation."2"9 Large-stakes, small-claims classes, those involving future
2' See Macey & Miller. supra note 64, at 28: Schwarzer, Stnicluring Multilain Litigation. supra note
67, at 1256.
2" See In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993) (referring to the
problem of providing adequate procedural protection for future claimants).
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claimants, and settlement class actions, all require careful judicial monitoring
to assure a fair, arm's-length bargaining process. 29" In these cases, it may
make sense to experiment carefully with various reform proposals that seek to
more closely align the interests of class counsel and class members, such as
auctioning off the lead counsel position as some have suggested.29' Even
with such reforms, however, an important place remains for courts to scruti-
nize carefully the adequacy of class action settlements, as they have on oc-
casion demonstrated they are capable of doing.292
Indeed, there may be much more efficient and reliable methods for assess-
ing the fairness of compensation that do not rely on the opt-out. Courts have
developed a number of sophisticated valuation techniques that may be just as
effective as relying on deductions and guesses derived from opt-outs.2 3 Re-
gression analysis and statistical methods can be used to estimate the value of
present and future claims. When all cases are collected in one proceeding, the
court can carefully select representative cases for full trials or mini-trials
294
in order to facilitate settlement by providing the parties with sufficient valu-
ation information. Sampling can be used to generate average awards for
claimants with particular characteristics. 2 5 Moreover, although large claim-
ants might not be perfect monitors that fairly represent the interests of all
claimants in mass tort cases, these claimants may help to deter some of the
"' See id. at 1437 (noting that "the quality and fidelity of counsel [is] of paramount importance in
class actions ... which involve unknown claimants").
." See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D.
688 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Auctions. however, are not without their own difficulties. Auctioning class representa-
tion is a change in the traditional litigation model that may not be palatable as a political matter and may
face significant opposition among attorneys who practice in the field. Even if this difficulty can be over-
come, an auction process also creates practical and theoretical challenges. Auctions may require a significant
amount of time to complete, which may further slow resolution of these matters. Professors Thomas and
Hansen have also noted additional problems with an auction process. See generally Randall S. Thomas &
Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analsis, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 423 (1993).
"2 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., *Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom,. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prod.
Liab. Litig.. 55 F.3d 768 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
"' See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights. Justice, and Utility in a World of Process
Scarcity. 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993); Rosenberg. End Games, supra note 13, at 709; Rosenberg, Individ-
ual Justice, supra note 12, at 570; Michael J. Saks and Peter D. Blanck, Justice hnproved: The Unrecog-
ni:ed Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts., 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992);
Schuck, supra note 4, at 959-60.
' See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jutry Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77 JUDICATURE
6 (1993).
"' See Saks & Blanck. supra note 293.
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more egregious kinds of agency costs if they are required to remain in the
class action.9
To be sure, these methods are not perfect. All of them reduce the potential
for individual adjudication. But it is important to remember that the potential
for such determinations is only limited for that subgroup of claimants which
would have been able to pursue an individual action. With this cost comes at
least the promise of awards that are more consistent among similarly situated
claimants and without the danger that either side will have to bet its future on
the outcome of a single jury trial. 97 What is more, these valuations can be
obtained without destroying one of the prime benefits of class ac-
tions-providing a global resolution of controversies.
For these reasons, core theory at a minimum provides significant support
for reforms that would permit courts to impose conditions on the right to opt
out.29 Such restrictions can be beneficial in attempting to maintain a core
because they have the effect of decreasing the value of singletons and inter-
mediate coalitions, thereby creating a greater possibility of finding a solution
within the core for the grand coalition. Such restrictions have the additional
benefit of maintaining the symbolism of litigative autonomy and an additional
market-checking function, albeit an imprecise and imperfect one, that may
provide some marginal deterrence against inadequate settlements. Problems
remain because even with restrictions, there will still be a significant tension
between the aggregative and individual systems. If one is intent on providing
some meaningful opportunity to opt out, then one of the primary design diffi-
culties will be crafting a restriction that is not so onerous that it takes away
all incentive to opt out, while at the same time creating a sufficient
disincentive to prevent large claimants from imposing externalities on those
who must remain in the class. Crafting such a precise restriction is likely to
be exceedingly difficult.
- See supra note 235. Indeed, this is the thrust of some of the reforms Congress recently enacted in
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(a). 109 Stat. 737 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.).
" See li re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995).
" See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation. supra note 4. at 925-30; Mullenix, Proposed Federal Proce-
dure Act, supra note 66, at 1066-67, 1072-73, Rosenberg, End Games, supra note 13, at 705-06, 714-15:
Rubin, supra note 26, at 449.
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Indeed, these difficulties suggest that courts should not be reticent to certify
mandatory class actions in at least some cases. The core theoretic model dem-
onstrates that limited fund cases where assets are insufficient to compensate
all claimants fully present only a subset of the cases where mandatory class
treatment may be appropriate. The difficulty in expanding mandatory classing
to all constant sum cases is in determining which cases involve true constant
sums. While class members' decisions to opt out of a class may not provide
a reliable indicator of sufficiency, defendants' actions may be equally ambig-
uous. It is trivially easy for a defendant to assert the presence of a constant
sum equal to the claims against it. Such an assertion may be true. A defen-
dant may propose a mandatory class because it wants to obtain a global res-
olution of a controversy in order to avoid significant legal and other costs
that may accrue if it must try numerous individual tort suits. It may believe
that a proposed settlement provides appropriate compensation to all parties
that may have been injured by its product.
But a defendant may equally seek mandatory classing when it has found a
pliable plaintiffs attorney willing to exchange a significant fee award for an
insufficient settlement. In a world of imperfect knowledge, courts may have
great difficulty distinguishing these kinds of cases, particularly with respect to
mass tort cases where enormous claims have been asserted and where there
may be great difficulty in determining with any precision the aggregate expo-
sure levels or the number of potential future claimants that might come for-
ward. In the pretrial setting where these determinations will be made, the
difficulties may be even greater. In such a world it is easy to see why a court
might want to rely on opt-out rights to do the job for it. In certain truly inde-
terminate settings opt-out rights, while clearly imperfect, may provide a
rough, although under the circumstances the best possible, market check
against collusion or inadequacy.
Recognizing these practical realities, however, does not support the level of
aversion that mandatory classing has often generated. 299 This resistance may
be more adequately explained by the unwillingness of courts to foreclose
plaintiffs from pursuing individual adjudications. Given this reluctance, a
finding that a fund was clearly insufficient to satisfy all pending claims may
have acted as a crude rule of thumb which enabled courts to identify readily
those cases that were clearly appropriate for mandatory classing. For courts
' See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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placing a premium on maintaining options for individual adjudication, requir-
ing a strict showing for obtaining mandatory classing strikes an appropriate
balance because the court can be reasonably certain that the possibility of
individual adjudication will not be mistakenly foreclosed.
Core theory, however, suggests that this balance has been improperly
struck. The model does not support those decisions that have placed extreme-
ly high hurdles for finding the existence of a limited fund. Requiring a lower
court to find that earlier awards would "inescapably affect later awards,"'"
simply makes no sense. The difficulties in proving the existence of such a
fund in a pretrial setting would likely mean that, as a practical matter, less
than all constant sum cases are certified as mandatory class actions.'' As a
result, the benefits of mandatory classing would not be realized in even the
narrowest subset of cases where the procedure is appropriate.
Of course, "numerous plaintiffs and a large ad damnum clause should [not]
guarantee (b)(1)(B) certification."3"2 The benefits of mandatory classing ac-
crue in a broader range of cases than those in which earlier awards will ines-
capably affect later ones; therefore, the rule should be more inclusive. A
more appropriate standard is "substantial probability,"3 3 under which the
court may certify a mandatory class action where "there is a substantial prob-
ability-that is less than a preponderance but more than a mere possibili-
ty-that if damages are awarded, the claims of earlier litigants would exhaust
the defendants' assets."3 " This standard encompasses both kinds of cases
where mandatory classing might be appropriate: those where a fund is clearly
insufficient and those where there is a constant sum, but claimants have other
avenues open to obtain a disproportionate share of the fund.
Core theory also suggests that settlement class actions may be appropriate
in certain circumstances. Such classes are useful because they constrain the
opportunity to opt out into the individualized tort system and thereby facili-
tate the finding of a core. In this way, settlement classes have the potential
for achieving many of the efficiency benefits that class actions have prom-
ised. But such classes should only be used when the dangers of potential
Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1982).
'' See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), inandanus
denied sub nont. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), and aJrI., 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987): Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382. 389 (D. Mass. 1979).
" Payton. 83 F.R.D. at 389.
' In re "Agent Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 726-27.
Id.
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collusive settlements can be minimized." As suggested previously, these
cases require careful judicial monitoring. As much as possible, courts should
ensure that different types of claimants have separate representation, and
should prohibit the kinds of side settlements that occurred in Georgine.3
These prohibitions will make it more difficult for attorneys to form cores by
impermissibly favoring the recovery of one type of claimant over another.
Finally, back-end opt-out rights, if properly structured, can also provide sig-
nificant protection against potentially inadequate settlements without impeding
excessively the ability to achieve a core.
There may be other reasons to have an opt-out rule that effectively gives
certain claimants strong exit options. Excessive bargaining costs can result
when, as may often be the case in class actions, the court that must approve
the settlement under Rule 23(e) has incomplete information about the parties'
positions and their relative entitlement to a given share of the fund. These
conditions may give rise to significant bargaining costs as each party negoti-
ates to obtain a recovery at the high end of the range that it believes the court
is likely to approve. If the players' subjective views of the case give them
significantly different ranges, then either the bargaining may be protracted or
a negotiated solution may be impossible.37 Providing exit options that set
the range of bargaining may prevent breakdowns of this sort to the extent that
all parties have sufficient information concerning the value of those op-
tions." 8
Moreover, opt-out rights may be important if mass tort class actions in fact
attract significant numbers of nonmeritorious claims,3" and if the presence
of those claims creates a claims-averaging effect that disproportionately disad-
vantages high-stakes claimants. Opt-out rights may serve to counteract these
effects. This conclusion is not without difficulties, however. As a preliminary
"' See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.. 83 F.3d 610. 631 (3d Cir.), cert. grantedsub non. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996): hi re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 743
(2d Cir. 1993), nmodifted, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
See supra notes 225-35 and accompanying text.
' See Posner, supra note 140. at 417-20; Priest & Klein, supra note 140, at 4-5 n.16, see also
McGovern. supra note 64, at 679 (explaining that in the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy proceeding. "[a] multi-
billion-dollar difference between management's estimates and the plaintiff's alleged total value of the
Dalkon Shield claims, coupled with over a one billion dollar difference in estimates of the total value of the
company, prevented negotiations from progressing past the preliminary stages").
3" Baird & Picker. supra note 132, at 347.
"' There is some evidence to support the idea that classes attract such claimants, or at least that they
attract claimants that may not haVe filed a claim but for the existence of the class. See Schuck, supra note 4,
at 960 n.93; Georgene Vairo. Reinventing Civil Procedure: Will the New Proceduiral Regime Help Resolve
Mass Torts?, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1065 (1993).
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matter, allowing opt-out rights in every case does not distinguish between
those cases in which class members opt out because they are in fact suffering
from adverse selection effects and those cases in which class members are
merely attempting to obtain a disproportionately large portion of a common
pool. Moreover, opt-outs may permit high-stakes claimants the opportunity to
avoid these adverse selection costs, but probably only by imposing significant
costs on small claimants. If the class action involves a constant sum, any
benefit that large claimants reap is likely to be borne by small claimants be-
cause opt-out rights fall short of creating a fully revealing separating equilib-
rium, i.e., one in which all of the different types of players choose different
strategies."' Instead, opt-out rights create a partially separating equilibrium
in which one type of claimant chooses the opt-out strategy and multiple types
remain in the class. The partially separating equilibrium only distinguishes
between those with claims that are economically viable as independent suits
and those without such claims. Self-selection still leaves two types of claim-
ants in the class. For those claimants that do not opt out, there will be no way
of telling without additional procedures (such as those in a claims resolution
facility) whether the claimant has a small claim that is valid but not economi-
cally viable as a stand-alone lawsuit or one that does not warrant any recov-
ery at all.
In other words, both the small claimants that class actions were designed to
protect and the nonmeritorious claims that seek to free ride off the class ac-
tion will tend not to opt out. Moreover, the separating equilibrium opt-out
rights create may further harm small claimants to the extent that opt-outs by
large claimants destroy the benefit of a class action settlement for the defen-
dant. In cases where the number of claimants opting out is significant, defen-
dants may choose not to settle with smaller claimants at all, either because of
the belief that the class consists of numerous nonmeritorious claims or be-
cause the defendant believes that the small claimants will not be able to
mount economically viable suits against it. In these case, the costs associated
with adverse selection (both in regard to the claims-averaging effect and those
associated with claims resolution facilities) may be borne by small claimants
while large claimants exercise their opt-out rights.
"" See RASMUSEN, supra note 129, at 160.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Core theory supports many of the observations made about the effects of
granting opt-outs in class actions. It provides a formal framework for the
intuitive observation that class attorneys, or class members who exercise stra-
tegic decisionmaking authority, will avail themselves of potentially more
valuable opportunities if they have a practical ability to do so. Although this
analysis does not address directly the difficult question of whether class ac-
tions or some other aggregative technique provides the best mechanism for
resolving mass torts cases,3"' it does demonstrate that any attempt to process
collectively mass torts through class actions, while still providing the promise
of individualization through opt-outs faces significant challenges.
Ultimately, the decision concerning whether or to what extent to constrain
opt-out rights is a normative one. The decision must be based on a determina-
tion as to how much individualism we want in our mass tort dispute resolu-
tion, and how much we are willing to sacrifice the efficiency and equity that
may come with the class action procedure to maintain that individualism.
Although core theory cannot answer that ultimate normative question, it is an
exceedingly useful tool for understanding the likely consequences resulting
from different dispute resolution designs. In this regard, core theory demon-
strates that opt-out rights can function in important, yet unintended ways. At
the same time, opt-out rights may fail to perform their expected functions,
thereby undercutting the rationales asserted for maintaining them. It is only
with an appreciation for the true costs and benefits of maintaining* opt-out
rights within the class mechanism that we can understand how to best struc-
ture those rights.
"' For example. Professor Coffee has suggested that if obtaining a global resolution of claims is an
important goal, then that objective is better accomplished through bankruptcy rather than through mandatory
classing because of the greater procedural protections claimants are provided. See Coffee, Class Wars. supra
note 4, at 1457-61; see also Resnik. supra note 4, at 930 (questioning whether one form of aggregative
resolution will predominate over others).
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